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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
“United We Stand”: Latino-Americans’  
Responses to Group and Individual Threats from Attitudes  
and Policies on Undocumented Immigration 
 
by 
Jesus Antonio Serrano Careaga 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 
Professor Yuen J. Huo, Chair 
 
As attention on undocumented immigration from Latin America continues to increase in the 
U.S., the conflation of Latinos (as an ethnic group) and undocumented immigrants may play an 
essential role in shaping the attitudes and behaviors of Latino-Americans (i.e., Latinos who are 
citizens or legal residents). The conflation of the two groups can be a source of both symbolic 
and realistic threats. As a symbolic threat (represented by Latino-Undocumented association 
beliefs), the conflation of the two groups can lead to concerns for Latino-Americans about how 
their ethnic group is viewed by the general public. As a realistic threat (measured by perceived 
linked fate with undocumented immigrants), Latino-Americans may come to believe that they 
are personally vulnerable to actions taken against undocumented immigrants. Moreover, anger 
on behalf of undocumented immigrants and fear about future risks to themselves may help 
explain the effects of both threats on Latino-Americans’ attitudes and behaviors. Across three 
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studies, I find evidence that the conflation of both groups increases Latino-Americans’ 
willingness to mobilize politically for a pathway to citizenship policies and increases how much 
they identify with undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, the conflation of the two groups may 
harm Latino-Americans by decreasing their feelings of belonging in America. These effects 
appear to be mediated by both feelings of anger and fear. The present findings suggest that, 
although the conflation of the two groups may increase doubts about their place in America, it 
may motivate Latino-Americans to seek social change.  
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Introduction 
For many Americans, the prototypical undocumented immigrant is likely a migrant from 
Latin America. Of the 10.5 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. today, close to 8 
million migrated from Latin America (Pew Research Center, 2019). Although a majority of 
undocumented immigrants are Latinos, most Latinos (over 80%) are U.S.-born citizens, 
naturalized citizens, or legal residents (Pew Research Center, 2016). Given the 
overrepresentation of Latinos in the undocumented immigrant population, Latinos have become 
synonymous with undocumented immigrants (Chavez, 2013).  
Politicians and news media likely reinforce the conflation of the two groups. For 
example, President Trump has made building a wall between the U.S.-Mexico border to reduce 
the number of Latino migrants who enter the country without authorization a policy priority 
since the early days of his first presidential campaign in 2015. This policy has been controversial 
and critiqued for potentially harming views about Latino immigrants and citizens in the U.S. 
Moreover, new stories about undocumented immigration focus extensively on Latinos which 
may create an implicit association between the two groups among Americans (Perez, 2016; 
Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). 
In the present research, the goal is to understand how the conflation of the two groups 
impacts Latinos. Specifically, the impact it has on Latinos who are not undocumented 
immigrants and how it shapes their attitudes and behaviors. For the remainder of this paper, I 
will use Latinos to refer to the entire ethnic group, regardless of differences in documented or 
undocumented status. Latino-Americans, as used here, refers to Latinos who were born in the 
U.S., are naturalized citizens, or are legal residents. For Latino-Americans, the conflation of their 
ethnic ingroup with undocumented immigrants can pose at least two significant threats: a 
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symbolic threat to their ingroup and a realistic threat to themselves. I argue that these threats will 
politically mobilize Latino-Americans to support policies that protect the status of their ingroup 
and personal wellbeing. Furthermore, I argue that feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented 
immigrants and fear for themselves will explain their responses to these threats. 
Latino-Undocumented Association as a Symbolic Threat to Latino-Americans  
Theories about intergroup relations consistently emphasize how people are affected by 
the perceived value and status of their ingroup. For example, social identity theory describes how 
the status of the ingroup influences a person’s self-esteem and shapes how they engage with 
outgroups (Hogg, 2016; Stets & Burke, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If they perceive their 
ingroup to have unjustly lost status compared to other groups, individuals are more willing to 
engage in active coping behaviors like collective action that can improve the overall standing of 
their ingroup (Hogg, 2016; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Niens & 
Cairns, 2002). Self-Categorization Theory describes how individuals define themselves using the 
traits attributed to their ingroup (Hornsey, 2008).  Moreover, Intergroup Threat Theory 
highlights how individuals are threatened when their ingroup’s values and what it stands for are 
in peril, a type of threat they describe as a symbolic threat (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). 
Overall, these theories predict that individuals are motivated to protect their ingroup from 
negative perceptions and the loss of status. In this project, I refer to the impact that views about 
undocumented immigrants have on views about Latinos as the Latino-Undocumented 
association. I argue that, among Latino-Americans, the Latino-Undocumented association is a 
symbolic threat that they are motivated to mobilize against to protect their ingroup.  
Impact on Perceptions of Latino-Americans as a Group. Past research has shown that 
Americans hold views about undocumented immigrants that are significantly more negative than 
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opinions about other marginalized or minority groups (including other immigrants) (Lee & 
Fiske, 2006; Suárez-Orozco et al., 2015). Moreover, these views can worsen depending on how 
the group is described (e.g., illegal vs. undocumented immigrants) (Alfaro & Bui, 2018; Pearson, 
2010; Rucker, Murphy, & Quintanilla, 2019). On the other hand, because of their status as an 
ethnic minority group, Latino-Americans are often confronted with doubts about whether they 
belong in the country and whether they are genuinely American (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Nadal, 
Mazzula, Rivera, & Fujii-Doe, 2014; Rivera, Forquer, & Rangel, 2010; Sue et al., 2007). 
The conflation of Latinos and undocumented immigrants can be concerning to Latino-
Americans because 1) it increases doubts about their group’s status as “true” Americans, and 2) 
negative views about undocumented immigrants can generalize to their ethnic group. For 
example, in a series of interviews, U.S.-born Mexican-Americans living in California and Kansas 
expressed concerns about the conflation of their group (i.e., Mexicans born in the U.S.) and 
Mexican immigrants (Jimenez, 2007). Several participants reported actively trying to distinguish 
themselves as members of the former group out of concerns that residents of their cities viewed 
all people of Mexican descent (U.S.-born or not) as being “the same.” For these respondents, 
their goal was to ward off negative stereotypes about immigrants (e.g., not having legal status, 
engaging in criminal behavior) from their group (i.e., U.S.-born Mexican-Americans) (Jimenez, 
2007). Although this study focused on people of Mexican descent, Latino-Americans of other 
backgrounds at a national level likely have similar concerns since non-Mexican Latino-
Americans have reported being treated like outsiders or second-class citizens because of their 
ethnicity (Nadal, Mazzula, Rivera, & Fujii-Doe, 2014; Rivera, Forquer, & Rangel, 2010). 
Coping with Symbolic Threats Against the Ingroup. To cope with symbolic threats 
against their ingroup, people adopt defensive responses aimed at eliminating or reducing the 
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threat. One commonly studied response is the increase of prejudice. When an outgroup threatens 
the ingroup’s values and status, people respond by showing more prejudiced behaviors and 
attitudes for the outgroup (e.g., Rios, 2013; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005; 
Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). Research on White Americans has often demonstrated this 
effect. For example, in a set of studies, researchers looked at White Americans' reactions to the 
risk of having their ingroup lose to ethnic minorities the ability to define what it means to be 
American (Danbold & Huo, 2015). Those most threatened were increasingly likely to engage in 
defensive responses to reduce the source of the threat, like supporting assimilation that favors the 
values and beliefs associated with White Americans. Similarly, White American participants in 
another study were more likely to distance themselves from poor White Americans when they 
felt this subgroup threatened the association between wealth, success, and their ethnic group 
(Kunstman, Plant, & Deska, 2013). By engaging in psychological distancing, participants were 
treating poor White Americans as a separate group to protect their ethnic ingroup. 
In the above examples, the symbolic threat came from another group changing how the 
ingroup is perceived (e.g., no longer prototypical; no longer wealthy and successful). Instead of a 
specific outgroup, the experience of having others mischaracterize the ingroup could also act as 
the source of a symbolic threat. In a previous study, Dutch participants recalled a time when 
another person wrongly attributed a trait to the participants’ ingroup and how they responded to 
that situation (Ellemers & Barreto, 2006). Participants could recall situations when the 
mischaracterization of their group was either positive (e.g., hardworking) or negative (e.g., lazy), 
as long as they disagreed with it when it happened. The results showed that participants were 
more likely to report having spoken out against a negative characterization, despite also 
experiencing discomfort from wrong positive characterizations of their ingroup (Ellemers & 
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Barreto, 2006). Other studies have similarly shown that people are increasingly willing to protest 
or speak out in situations where they disagree with a social identity that others apply to them 
(Barreto & Ellemers, 2003; Barreto, Ellemers, Scholten, & Smith, 2010). Although these studies 
focused on participants' experience at the individual level, people possibly engage in similar 
responses when their ingroup is mischaracterized or conflated with other groups. 
Evidence that the conflation of the ingroup with an outgroup threatens individuals comes 
from a set of studies by Flores and Huo (2013). Asian-American and Latino-American 
participants reacted to scenarios where a partner conflated their national origin identity (e.g., 
Salvadoran, Vietnamese) with other national identities (e.g., Salvadoran with Mexican; 
Vietnamese with Japanese) or recognized them as distinct identities. When the partner conflated 
the identities, participants showed stronger adverse reactions toward that person. In this study, 
the partners’ conflation of the participants’ ingroup with another group caused the adverse 
reaction. Participants did not simply derogate their partners because they belonged to an 
outgroup.  
For Latino-Americans who experience a symbolic threat from the conflation of their 
ethnic group and undocumented immigrants, it may be challenging to identify a specific group as 
the source of threat. Americans of all backgrounds (including other Latino-Americans) are likely 
to conflate the two groups, which could make prejudice against other Americans a less likely 
response to this behavior. Instead, many Latino-Americans may see the unresolved status of 
undocumented immigrants in the country as the cause of the conflation. Increasing the number of 
undocumented immigrants who have legal status or reducing their numbers in the country could 
be seen as a way to lower threats to the status of Latino-Americans. Therefore, Latino-Americans 
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could respond to this threat by mobilizing for policies or actions that aim to resolve the issue of 
undocumented immigration in the U.S. (e.g., a pathway to citizenship policies). 
Interestingly, in a survey of Latino-Americans following the 2016 presidential election, 
participants were more likely to support immigrant rights activism if they believed anti-
immigrant sentiments were actually anti-Latino sentiments (Wallace & Zepeda-Millán, 2020). 
The 2016 presidential election was notable for the nativist and anti-immigrant character of the 
Trump presidential campaign. It may have significantly shaped perceived associations between 
anti-immigrant and anti-Latino sentiments. This survey finding supports the argument that the 
conflation of the two groups is more threatening to Latino-Americans than undocumented 
immigrants as a group. 
Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants as a Realistic Threat to Latino-Americans 
 In addition to posing a symbolic threat, the conflation of Latinos and undocumented 
immigrants can also present a realistic threat to Latino-Americans. Intergroup threat theory 
describes realistic threats as perceived risks to the economic or physical wellbeing of a group or 
an individual (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). In the context under investigation, Latino-
Americans may worry that the conflation of the two groups will make it more likely they will 
personally be treated like undocumented immigrants.   
 First, when state and local governments adopt punitive policies aimed at identifying and 
arresting undocumented immigrants, their implementation has been consistently described as a 
danger to the safety of the Latino community. Here I do not argue for or against this 
characterization of punitive immigration policies and their effects. Instead, I am highlighting 
how this conventional narrative likely reinforces for Latino-Americans a negative relationship 
between their ethnic group and immigration policies in the U.S.  
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Several studies have, for example, looked at the negative impact of punitive immigration 
policies on the quality of life and health of Latinos in the U.S. (e.g., Becerra, Androff, Cimino, 
Wagaman, & Blanchard, 2013; Hatzenbuehler et al., 2017; Philbin, Flake, Hatzenbuehler, & 
Hirsch, 2018; Rhodes et al., 2015). Similarly, existing research provides evidence for the 
increased risk of racial profiling of Latino-Americans as a result of the implementation of 
punitive policies at the state level (Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013; Romero, 2006; 
Szkupinski Quiroga, Medina, & Glick, 2014). In general, these types of studies report adverse 
life outcomes for Latino-Americans and may inform news coverage on these issues. Meanwhile, 
mainstream media typically focuses on the Latino community when reporting stories about 
undocumented immigrants, and this focus has historically intensified during times when policies 
that target undocumented immigrants are the focus of national and local debates (Menjivar, 
2016; Perez, 2016; Reny & Manzano, 2016; Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). Therefore, it is 
likely that Latino-Americans frequently encounter stories that reinforce perceptions that punitive 
immigration policies are a threat to themselves.  
 Second, there is evidence that suggests that punitive immigration policies do, in fact, 
unsettle Latino-Americans. For example, a survey of Latino-Americans residing in Arizona and 
New Mexico found significant differences in feelings of belonging between residents of the two 
states (Schildkraut, Jiménez, Dovidio, & Huo, 2019). U.S.-born Latino-Americans from Arizona, 
a state that has adopted an increasingly punitive approach to immigration enforcement, reported 
lower feelings of belonging in their state than their counterparts from New Mexico. Compared to 
Arizona, New Mexico’s immigration policies and law enforcement were considered more 
welcoming to immigrants at the time of the study. Moreover, when U.S.-born Latino-Americans 
think about immigration policies that could be enacted by their state in the future, their feelings 
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of belonging decrease when the policies are hostile to immigrants (Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, & 
Schildkraut, 2018).  
The impact of these policies, however, is not limited to feelings of belonging. For 
example, Latino-Americans also report feeling more pessimistic about the future quality of life 
for themselves and their children in response to punitive law enforcement (Becerra et al., 2013). 
Finally, in a study of Latino-Americans from South Phoenix between 2009-2010, researchers 
found that most respondents expressed distress about the safety of family, friends, and 
themselves and that the distress was caused by local punitive immigration policies (Szkupinski 
Quiroga, Medina, & Glick, 2014). Notably, during this timeframe, punitive immigration policies 
like Senate Bill 1070 (SB1070) were proposed and later passed in Arizona. SB1070 was a policy 
that included a controversial provision that required police officers to question individuals about 
their immigration status when they had reasonable suspicion that the target was an 
undocumented immigrant (Johnson, 2012).  The provision raised concerns that ethnicity or skin 
color would influence officers’ perceptions of “reasonable suspicion” and that it would result in 
the racial profiling of Latino-Americans. Furthermore, these participants resided in low-income 
neighborhoods, which possibly made them more vulnerable to encounters with law enforcement. 
When faced with the conflation of their ethnic group and undocumented immigrants, 
many Latino-Americans might question their vulnerability to punitive policies that target 
undocumented immigrants. The more confident they are about the risks this conflation poses to 
their wellbeing, the more likely they will be to confront this threat. 
 Coping with Realistic Threat from Conflation of Groups. If policies that target 
undocumented immigrants pose a risk to Latino-Americans, one possible outcome is for Latino-
Americans to respond by exhibiting more prejudice against undocumented immigrants. Studies 
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that look at the impact of realistic threats from an outgroup have shown an increase in prejudiced 
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & Polifroni, 2008; Morrison & Ybarra, 
2008; Zárate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004). Therefore, if Latino-Americans perceive 
undocumented immigrants as the source of the realistic threat, they will likely express more 
negative attitudes toward undocumented immigrants. A study on attitudes about Mexican 
immigrants potentially illustrates this outcome. When researchers primed students from El Paso, 
Texas (a U.S.-Mexico border city) to think about Mexican immigrants as a threat to their 
employment opportunities, students expressed more negative attitudes about those immigrants 
(Zárate et al., 2004). However, work from social and political psychology provides support for 
the opposite prediction that a coalition between Latinos and undocumented immigrants will form 
when the conflation of the two groups is perceived as the source of the realistic threat. 
 When members of different minority groups share similar experiences of discrimination, 
the expressed intergroup attitudes are more favorable. For example, Asian- and Latino-American 
students who were reminded of racial discrimination against members of their ethnic groups 
reported more positive attitudes about African Americans (Craig & Richeson, 2012). Similarly, 
when researchers drew direct parallels between groups who experience discrimination for 
different reasons (e.g., sexual orientation discrimination vs. racial discrimination), members of 
those minority groups were more supportive of policies that benefitted the other marginalized 
group (Cortland et al., 2017). Presenting gay marriage as a civil rights issue caused straight 
African American participants to express more support for same-sex marriage (Cortland et al., 
2017). In summary, priming members of marginalized groups to consider how their experiences 
are like those of other groups can strengthen relations between those groups. 
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 Work on inclusive victim consciousness has found similar results. Inclusive victim 
consciousness refers to a type of solidarity that develops between members of distinct 
marginalized groups when their experiences of discrimination parallel each other, which can lead 
to more intergroup advocacy and support (Vollhardt, 2015). Among Vietnamese Americans 
whose family entered the U.S. as refugees, higher inclusive victim consciousness predicted 
greater commitment to advocating for refugees from other countries (Vollhardt, Nair, & Tropp, 
2016). Outside of the U.S., higher inclusive victim consciousness among individuals from 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda predicted a greater willingness to 
advocate on behalf of other ethnic groups in their countries (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015). The three 
countries are currently experiencing or previously experienced high levels of intergroup violence 
in the not too distant past: ongoing ethnic conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a 
civil war in Burundi between 1993 and 2005, and genocide against minority groups in Rwanda in 
1994. 
Finally, research on linked fate further supports the prediction that the threat experienced 
from group conflation can strengthen relations between undocumented immigrants and Latino-
Americans. Linked fate refers to the belief that what happens to a person is directly affected by 
what happens to members of a specific group (Czaja, Junn, & Mendelberg, 2016; Dawson, 
1994). When people believe they have linked fate with a group, they expect the quality of their 
experiences as an individual to increase as the group’s experiences improve. This perspective 
also applies to negative experiences. More negative experiences for the group suggest more 
negative experiences for the individual. Linked fate can then translate to supporting policies that 
will benefit the group or to mobilizing on behalf of the group. 
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Linked fate was introduced as an explanation of the political behavior of African 
Americans (Dawson, 1995; Simien, 2005).  African Americans share a history of oppression and 
discrimination that results from the negative associations related to the color of their skin. 
Individual differences in educational attainment and socioeconomic status do not make African 
Americans immune to race-based discrimination. Therefore, these experiences can lead to beliefs 
that what happens to other African Americans will also happen to them personally.  
 Among Latino-Americans, perceptions of linked fate also appear to meaningfully impact 
their attitudes and behaviors. Data from a 2006 national survey of Latino-Americans found that 
perceptions of linked fate increased with higher educational attainment and lower levels of 
assimilation into American culture (Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010). Notably, the personal 
experiences of discrimination for participants of this survey did not predict an increase or 
decrease in linked fate. However, a later study found that Latino-Americans report greater levels 
of linked fate in areas with a higher number of punitive laws that target undocumented 
immigrants (Vargas, Sanchez, & Valdez, 2017). Furthermore, as perceptions of ethnic linked fate 
(i.e., linked fate with Latinos regardless of immigrant or residency status) increase, Latino-
Americans’ support for activism on behalf of immigrant rights increases (Wallace & Zepeda-
Millán, 2020). 
 Most research on perceptions of linked-fate among Latino-Americans has focused on 
ethnic linked fated. A few exceptions have measured linked fate with immigrants (Gutierrez, 
Ocampo, Barreto, & Segura, 2019) or undocumented immigrants (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 
2019). Both studies found that as Latino-Americans perceived more linked fate with the two 
groups, they are more willing to engage in political activities to support immigrants. More work 
to understand the impact of linked fate with undocumented immigrants is needed as it may help 
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explain why, for example, more hostile policies toward undocumented immigrants can elicit 
more positive attitudes for that group among Latino-Americans (Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, 
Schildkraut, 2018). By mobilizing politically on behalf of undocumented immigrants, Latino-
Americans could perceive two benefits: 1) a reduction in the likelihood that punitive immigration 
policies will negatively impact them and 2) improve the experience of undocumented immigrants 
in the U.S.  
In the current research, linked fate is used as an indicator of the perceived susceptibility 
to realistic threats caused by the conflation of Latinos and undocumented immigrants. 
Anger and Fear Can Mobilize Latinos-Americans Politically 
 In response to both symbolic and realistic threats to Latino-Americans, I have described 
political mobilization as a possible coping response. Both types of threats can evoke a strong 
emotional response from Latino-Americans: anger about the experiences faced by undocumented 
immigrants and fear that they will personally experience similar consequences. Emotional 
responses to threats are relevant to this discussion because they are critical to political and 
collective action as they can either promote or suppress behaviors (Brader & Wayne, 2016; van 
Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). 
 Anger as a Catalyst for Political Behaviors. Many people feel angry when they see that 
others are mistreated because of their group identity. Anger makes people more likely to 
mobilize on behalf of the victimized group when this treatment considered unfair (Jasper, 1998; 
Pagano & Huo, 2007; Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 
2004). Moreover, anger can be a particularly powerful motivator of collective action when there 
is a specific target like a government entity or a policy that individuals can mobilize against 
(Goodwin, Jasper, & Polleta, 2009; Jasper, 1998). When a person believes they will be similarly 
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mistreated, they should be more motivated to protest than those who do not feel at risk 
(Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2009; Green & Cowden, 1992). 
 If the conflation of their ethnic group and undocumented immigrants symbolically and 
realistically threatens Latino-Americans, feelings of anger may explain their increased 
willingness to mobilize on behalf of undocumented immigrants. For example, surveyed Latino-
Americans who reported feeling angry about the 2016 presidential election season were more 
likely to have engaged in political activities like working for a campaign or engaging in protests 
(Gutierrez et al., 2019). Furthermore, the feelings of anger reported by participants strongly 
associated with perceptions of discrimination against Latino-Americans and their perceived 
linked fate with undocumented immigrants. Similarly, my work on U.S.-born Latino-Americans 
showed that as feelings of anger about the experiences faced by undocumented immigrants 
increased, they were more likely to engage in activities like attending rallies, contacting 
politicians, and donating money to fight for the rights of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. 
(Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019). 
Mixed Evidence for the Role of Fear in Motivating Political Behaviors. A second 
emotion that Latino-Americans could experience in response to immigration policies and 
authorities is fear. Fear can result from the expectation that perceptions of their group will 
worsen and that immigration authorities will mistreat them if they are mistaken for 
undocumented immigrants. In this case, fear could promote collective action as a way to escape 
future threats to the self and ingroup.  
Research on fear and its impact on behaviors shows that the effects less consistent than 
the effects of anger. For collective action, several studies have found evidence that fear 
suppresses active coping behaviors (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006; Miller, Cronin, Garcia, & 
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Branscombe, 2009; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008). Fear 
makes people more cautious about taking risks (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003) and 
less likely to be action-oriented (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014). Many of these studies, however, 
have looked at fear of events that had already happened (e.g., past terrorist attacks, previous 
financial crises). 
If people are focused on avoiding future risks, research on health behaviors suggests that 
fear can promote active coping responses. In Uganda, a reduction in AIDS cases may have been 
caused in part by an increase in risk avoidance behaviors (e.g., having fewer casual partners) 
resulting from the fear of being infected (Stoneburner & Low-Beer, 2004). Unlike citizens of 
neighboring countries, Ugandans were significantly more likely to personally know someone 
who died from AIDS or was living with it, which likely bolstered the effects of fear. Similarly, 
worrying about developing breast cancer has been linked to an increase in cancer screenings 
among women (Consedine, Magai, Neugut, 2004; Lagerlund, Hedin, Sparén, Thurfjell, & 
Lambe, 2000; McCaul, Schroeder, & Reid, 1996). Among men, fear about developing prostate 
cancer can also promote undergoing health screenings, although these positive effects disappear 
when fear is too high (Consedine, Morgenstern, Kudadjie-Gyamfi, Magai, & Neugut, 2006). 
Importantly, health campaigns that use fear appeals to scare citizens into action can succeed if 
those who are targeted believe they can successfully reduce or eliminate the threat (Witte, K., 
1992).  
Fear of being a victim of future terrorist attacks increases support for military action, 
especially when victims of past events were considered ingroup members (Dumont, Yzerbyt, 
Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Research on environmental activism also provides experimental 
evidence for fear as an emotion that mobilizes people. Individuals fearing future harmful changes 
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to the environment are increasingly willing to engage in collective action to prevent climate 
change if they believe it is an effective response (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010). Finally, 
Latino-Americans, who reported feeling fear when thinking about the experiences of 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S., were more willing to engage in collective action on 
behalf of immigrants (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019). Based on the reviewed research, Latino-
Americans experiencing fear because of the conflation of their ethnic group with undocumented 
immigrants may be more likely to engage in political activities to reduce the threat from 
immigration policies.  
The Present Research 
Across three studies, I explore how the conflation of undocumented immigrants and 
Latinos presents both a symbolic threat and a realistic threat to Latino-Americans. The effects of 
both threats on Latino-Americans’ political mobilization intentions and changes in identity-
related responses are analyzed. If the conflation of the two groups threatens Latino-Americans, 
they should be more likely to see policies that improve the status of undocumented immigrants 
as a way to reduce threats against their ethnic ingroup and themselves. Their willingness to 
engage in actions that would support the adoption of these policies is referred to as political 
mobilization. Additionally, because the conflation of both groups may help emphasize the shared 
experiences between them, I expect these threats to make attitudes about undocumented 
immigrants more positive among Latino-Americans. The identity-related measures included in 
the studies presented here are about feelings of closeness to undocumented immigrants and other 
Latinos, solidarity with undocumented immigrants, and feelings of belonging in America.  
Studies 1 and 2 are experiments. To test the impact of a symbolic threat from the 
conflation of both groups, I primed Latino-Americans with information about how views about 
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undocumented immigrants are associated with views about their ethnic group. To test the impact 
of a realistic threat, I primed Latino-Americans with information about their linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants. In Studies 1 and 2, I test the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (response to a symbolic threat): When Latino-Americans think that views 
about undocumented immigrants influence views about their ethnic group,  
• they will be more likely to engage in political activities for a pathway to 
citizenship policies.  
• their attitudes about undocumented immigrants will be more positive.  
• their feelings of belonging in the U.S. will decrease. 
Hypothesis 2 (response to a realistic threat): When Latino-Americans think they will 
personally be affected by policies that target undocumented immigrants,  
• they will be more likely to engage in political activities for a pathway to 
citizenship policies.  
• their attitudes about undocumented immigrants will also improve. 
• their feelings of belonging in the U.S. will decrease. 
Hypothesis 3: Responses to the symbolic threat against their ethnic group should be 
stronger for Latino-Americans who believe that policies that target undocumented 
immigrants will personally impact them.  
Hypothesis 4: Feelings of anger and fear will mediate Latino-Americans' response to 
both the symbolic and realistic threats from the conflation of the two groups. 
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Why would Latino-Americans be more supportive of a pathway to citizenship when 
threatened by the conflation of the two groups? It is likely that perceptions that many 
undocumented immigrants, mainly from Latin America, live in the country increase expectations 
that the two groups will be conflated. If the number of undocumented Latinos decreases, Latino-
Americans might expect this to weaken the association between being an undocumented 
immigrant and being a Latino in the U.S. Also, given the shared experiences of discrimination 
between the two groups and that many Latino-Americans may know someone who is an 
undocumented immigrant, Latino-Americans may generally be more receptive to this type of 
policy than more punitive policies. 
However, one alternative prediction to consider is whether Latino-Americans will be 
willing to engage in political activities for policies that could reduce threats to their ethnic group 
and themselves but harm undocumented immigrants. Increasing arrests and deportations of 
undocumented immigrants could, like a pathway to citizenship policies, reduce the threats caused 
by the conflation of the two groups. Latino-Americans could interpret the decrease in 
undocumented immigrants as a result of this punitive policy as an effective way to reduce the 
conflation of the two groups. If Latino-Americans are equally supportive of punitive and 
immigrant-friendly policies, this may indicate that they are generally more supportive of any 
approach that could reduce the conflation of the two groups when responding to these threats.  
In these studies, I also compare Latino-Americans' anger on behalf of undocumented 
immigrants and fear of future risks against themselves. In a previous study, I showed that anger 
and fear Latino-Americans experienced when thinking about what undocumented immigrants go 
through in the U.S. explained their willingness to engage in political activities on behalf of 
immigrants (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019). However, studies 1 and 2 will allow me to more 
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clearly compare how emotions about others and themselves similarly or differentially shape 
collective action intentions and attitudes about undocumented immigrants. 
Finally, Study 3 is an exploratory study where I look at how the effects described above 
may translate to a more general context. As I discussed above, the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election spotlighted the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos, and past studies 
indicate that Latino-Americans may have been threatened by the campaign messages and 
subsequent presidential administration of Donald Trump (Gutierrez, Ocampo, Barreto, & Segura, 
2019; Wallace & Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Using longitudinal survey data of Latino-Americans 
from 2016 and 2019, I look at the impact of linked fate with other Latinos on advocacy for 
minorities and support for punitive and welcoming immigration policies. 
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Study 1: Effect of Conflation on Political Mobilization, Feelings of Closeness, & 
Belonging 
In Study 1, the goal was to establish that priming Latino-Americans with a symbolic 
threat to their ethnic ingroup and realistic threat to the self from the conflation of Latinos and 
undocumented immigrants differentially predict their willingness to support a pathway to 
citizenship policies and punitive immigration policies. I expected more support for a pathway to 
citizenship policies and less support for punitive immigration policies. Furthermore, a second 
goal was to examine how these threats impacted attitudes about both undocumented immigrants 
and other Latinos. I predicted that attitudes about both groups would be more positive in 
response to these threats. Third, Study 1 looked at changes in feelings of belonging in America. 
Based on previous research, I expected that both symbolic and realistic threats would lead to a 
decrease in Latino-Americans’ feelings of belonging (Schildkraut, Jiménez, Dovidio, & Huo, 
2019; Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, & Schildkraut, 2018). Finally, Study 1 tested the role of anger and 
fear as mediators for this effect. Anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants was expected to 
mediate the effects of both types of threats on all four outcome variables. In contrast, fear about 
future risks to the self was expected only to mediate Latino-Americans' willingness to engage in 
political activities to support undocumented immigrants. 
Method 
 Participants. Three hundred and fifty U.S. born Latinos were initially recruited through 
the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. Because it is difficult to assess the legal residency status 
of immigrants with these surveys, only participants who were born in the U.S. could participate 
in the study. Out of the 350 participants who completed the study, several were excluded from 
the analyses for the following reasons: they incorrectly responded to the information check 
20 
 
questions; they stated that they were born outside of the U.S. the second time they were asked 
about their place of birth at the end of the survey; they indicated that they belonged to an ethnic 
group other than Latinos. Participants in the final sample of 153 had an average age of 32.27 
years (SD = 7.95), and 66.7% were men. Approximately 50% identified as Democrats, 27.5% as 
Republicans, and 17% as Independent. Most participants (57.5%) reported that both parents were 
born in the U.S., 18.3% had one immigrant parent, and for 24.2% reported that both parents were 
immigrants. 
 Design and procedure. Participants were recruited for a 2 (strong vs. weak Latino-
Undocumented association) x 2 (high vs. low linked fate with undocumented immigrants) 
between-subjects experiment described as a survey on responses to news reporting of current 
events with an expected duration of 10 to 15 minutes. Prospective participants first completed a 
short demographic questionnaire, and only those who initially identified as U.S. born Latinos 
were eligible to participate. Eligible participants were paid $1.50 for completing the study. 
Participants read three ostensibly real news articles about current events. After reading each 
news article, participants responded to three short questions about the article, including an 
information check question to verify that they read and understood that article’s main idea. The 
first article was a filler article about internet access in Alaska, and all participants read the article.  
For the second article, participants were randomly assigned to either the strong Latino-
Undocumented association condition or the weak Latino-Undocumented association condition. 
The articles presented in these conditions were adapted from Serrano-Careaga & Huo (2019). In 
the strong Latino-Undocumented association condition, participants read an article about the 
results of a survey, which showed that Americans overestimate how many U.S. Latinos are 
undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, participants read a quote ostensibly from an American 
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who conflates the two groups. The article included the following information (see Appendix A 
for complete article): 
 
In a recent national survey, Americans were asked how many Latinos currently residing 
in the U.S. are in the country illegally. On average, Americans believe that close to 40 % 
of Latinos are in the U.S. illegally. This is more than twice the official estimate of 18% 
reported by the federal government. 
 
When asked about his response to the question about ‘illegal’ Latinos, Chicago-resident 
John Danvers stated, “I hear stories about Latinos crossing the border on the news so it 
seems likely that a lot of them are here illegally. So if I don’t know someone personally 
and they look Latino, I assume that they or members of their family are illegal.” Much 
like Mr. Danvers, a large number of the interviewed participants reported that they 
assume Latinos they meet are here illegally unless they learn otherwise. 
 
In the weak Latino-Undocumented association condition, participants read a version of 
the article that reported results that showed Americans underestimate the number of U.S. Latinos 
who are undocumented immigrants (see Appendix B for complete article): 
 
In a recent national survey, Americans were asked how many Latinos currently residing 
in the U.S. are in the country illegally. On average, Americans believe that close to 15% 
of Latinos are in the U.S. illegally. This is less than the official estimate of 18% reported 
by the federal government. 
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When asked about his response to the question about ‘illegal’ Latinos, Chicago-resident 
John Danvers stated, “Although I hear many stories on the news about Latinos crossing 
the border, many were born here, immigrated legally, or became legal. So if I don’t know 
someone personally and they look Latino, I don’t just assume that they or members of 
their family are illegal.” Much like Mr. Danvers, a large number of the interviewed 
participants reported that they assume Latinos they meet are here legally unless they learn 
otherwise. 
 
For the third and final article, participants were randomly assigned to either the high 
linked fate condition or the low linked fate condition. In the high linked fate condition, 
participants were asked to read an article about a substantial increase in wrongful immigration 
arrests of Latinos between 2012 and 2018. The article included the excerpts shown below, along 
with a graph that showed a dramatic increase in wrongful arrests. Like with the previous two 
conditions, participants read a quote ostensibly from a Latino-American who worried about 
racial profiling (see Appendix C for complete article): 
 
Despite having legal status, a significant number of Latinos across the country have been 
wrongfully detained by immigration officials following traffic stops, police questioning, 
or immigration raids. This increase in arrests is alarming, as the number of people 
wrongly arrested in 2018 is six times the number of Latinos who were arrested in 2012. 
 
Latinos in communities across the country have expressed concerns about these recent 
findings. “I used to walk to the corner store with only cash and my phone in my pocket, 
23 
 
but now I don’t feel safe going out without my license. I feel that I always need to have 
some proof that I was born in the U.S. or things might not go well for me,” said Sergio 
Gomez from Laredo, Texas. 
 
In the low linked fate condition, the article described how wrongful immigration arrests 
of Latinos had remained low and constant between 2012 and 2018. Along with a graph depicting 
the constant rate of arrests, participants read the following excerpt and quote (see Appendix D 
for complete article): 
 
The lack of an increase in arrests is encouraging as the number of people wrongly 
arrested in 2018 is almost equal to the number of Latinos who were wrongly arrested in 
2012. Overall, wrongful arrests during these years were low. 
 
Residents of Latino communities across the country have expressed relief following the 
release of these recent findings. “I’m definitely surprised but relieved. I’ll feel safer 
walking to the corner store with just cash and my phone in my pocket and without ID. It’s 
good to know that I don’t have to worry about proving that I was born in the U.S.,” said 
Sergio Gomez of Laredo, Texas. 
 
After reading the three articles, participants completed a questionnaire.  
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Measures.  
Latino-Undocumented Association Information Check. Participants were asked to 
answer the following question to confirm that they understood the main idea of the Latino-
Undocumented association article they read: “According to the article you just read, the results 
of the national survey found which of the following?” There were three possible responses: 1-
Americans’ estimates of undocumented Latinos far exceed official numbers (the correct response 
for those in the strong Latino-Undocumented association condition); 2-Americans’ estimates of 
undocumented Latinos are slightly lower than official numbers (the correct response for those in 
the weak Latino-Undocumented association condition); 3- The article did not give this 
information. 
Linked Fate Information Check. To confirm that participants understood the main idea 
of the linked fate article they were assigned to read, they answered the following question: 
“According to the article, recent reports describe wrongful immigration arrests of Latinos who 
are U.S. citizens or legal residents in which of the following ways?” There were three possible 
answers: 1-Wrongful arrests of Latinos have NOT substantially increased (the correct answer for 
the low linked fate condition); 2-Wrongful arrests of Latinos have substantially increased (the 
correct answer for the high linked fate condition); 3-The article did not give this information. 
Latino-Undocumented Association Beliefs. To test whether our manipulation for the 
Latino-Undocumented association variable primed participants with the correct perspective, 
participants were asked to respond to the following question: “More Latinos have legal status 
than is commonly assumed; Most Americans think about Latinos when they talk about 
illegal/undocumented immigration.” Answers ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree) (r = .33). 
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Perceived Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants. To test whether the 
manipulation used for the linked fate variable primed participants with the correct perspectives, 
participants responded to the following questions: “How well I do will depend on how well 
illegal/undocumented immigrants do; What happens to illegal/undocumented immigrants will 
affect me.” Answers ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (r = .80).  
Political Mobilization for Arrests and Deportations. Participants were asked to indicate 
how likely they are to engage in political behaviors in support of three different policies that are 
meant to resolve the status of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. For the first policy, 
participants read the following scenario: “One policy would crackdown on undocumented 
immigrants living in the country today. This means that the federal government would focus most 
of their efforts and resources on arresting and deporting undocumented immigrants who are 
currently residing in the U.S. How likely is it that you would engage in each of the following 
activities to support this policy?” Five political activities were listed: sign a petition; attend a 
rally or demonstration; write or share a post on social media; try convincing friends and family 
members to support the policy; call a senator or representative; attend a rally or demonstration. 
Participants indicated their response on a 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely) for each activity (α 
= .96). 
Political Mobilization for Pathway to Citizenship. For the second policy, participants 
read the following scenario: “Another possible policy would establish a pathway to citizenship. 
This means that the federal government would pass legislation to grant legal residency status to 
undocumented immigrants who have lived in the country for over 10 years, are currently 
employed, have a clean criminal history, and are not affiliated with criminal or terrorist 
organizations. Eligible individuals would also have to meet minimal knowledge requirements in 
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U.S. history, government, and the English language. How likely is it that you would engage in 
each of the following activities to support this policy?” Participants reported their willingness to 
participate in the same activities as in the previous question (α = .92). 
Political Mobilization for Citizenship for Childhood Arrivals. For the third policy, 
participants reported their willingness to engage in the same five activities as before using the 
same scale after reading the following description: “Finally, a third policy would establish a 
pathway to citizenship only for childhood arrivals. This means that the federal government 
would pass legislation to grant legal residency status only for undocumented immigrants who 
were brought to the country as children and have no criminal history. How likely is it that you 
would engage in each of the following activities to support this policy?” (α = .93). 
Feelings of Closeness to Undocumented Immigrants. To measure participants' feelings 
of closeness with undocumented immigrants, they were asked to state how much they agreed 
with two statements: “I feel close to undocumented immigrants” and “I feel a bond 
with undocumented immigrants.” Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree), and responses to both statements were strongly correlated (r = .94). 
Feelings of Closeness to Other Latinos. Participants were also asked to state how much 
they agreed with the following statements, “I feel close to Latinos” and “I feel a bond 
with Latinos.”  Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
and their response to both items were strongly correlated (r = .82).  
Feelings of Belonging. To assess participants’ feelings of belonging in America, they 
were asked to agree or disagree with the following statements, “I feel like I belong in America; I 
think others see me as an American; I feel like I am a part of America.” Responses ranged from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (α = .78). 
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Anger on Behalf of Undocumented Immigrants. Anger about the treatment of 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S. was measured using the following two items: I get mad 
when I think about how the federal government treats undocumented immigrants; Thinking about 
policies that hurt undocumented immigrants makes me angry on their behalf. Responses ranged 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (r = .89). 
Fear of Future Risks to Self. Fear about being treated like undocumented immigrants in 
the future was measured with the following two items: I feel afraid when I think about how the 
federal government’s proposed policies targeting undocumented immigration could affect me; I 
am worried that I could one day be treated like an undocumented immigrant by federal 
immigration authorities. Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (r = 
.86). 
Results 
 Initially, I planned to test my hypotheses by conducting two-way analysis of variance 
tests to determine the effect of the independent variables, Latino-Undocumented association 
(strong vs. weak) and linked fate (high vs. low), on each dependent variable. Before proceeding 
with these tests, I verified that the manipulations of the independent variables were successful by 
testing the effect of each on responses to their corresponding manipulation check questions using 
one-way ANOVA tests. For the Latino-Undocumented association manipulation check 
questions, responses were not significantly influenced by whether they were assigned to the 
strong (M = 5.53, SD = 1.35) or weak association (M = 5.32, SD = 1.36) conditions, F (1, 152) = 
.90, p = .345. Similarly, for the Linked Fate manipulation check questions, participants’ 
responses in the high linked fate condition (M = 3.88, SD = 2.07) were not significantly different 
from responses in the low linked fate condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.77), F (1, 151) = .12, p = .727.  
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Since the independent variable manipulations were not successful, I did not run the planned 
ANOVA tests as the results would be uninterpretable.  Therefore, the results that follow are 
correlational findings. I used the manipulation check questions, Latino-Undocumented 
association beliefs and perceived linked fate, as the predictors. The outcome variables remained 
the same. 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the predictors and outcome variables, as well 
as the correlations between those variables. Responses to the pathway to citizenship and 
citizenship for childhood arrivals questions were highly correlated, r = .74, p < .01. Because both 
sets of questions asked participants about their willingness to engage in different political 
activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies, they were combined into one scale (α = 
.95). The new variable will be referred to as pathway to citizenship in the analyses reported 
below. 
 Based on the original hypotheses for Study 1, it was expected that there would be a 
significant main effect of Latino-Undocumented association beliefs such that more reported 
association beliefs would predict the following: 
• greater willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship 
policies 
• less willingness to support punitive policies 
• more positive attitudes about both undocumented immigrants and other Latinos 
• fewer feelings of belonging in America. 
A significant main effect of perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants was also 
predicted, and the effects on the outcome variables were expected to be in the same direction as 
those described above for association beliefs. Furthermore, a significant interaction between the 
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two predictors was also predicted. As perceptions of linked fate increased, I expected the effects 
of association beliefs to grow stronger. Finally, feelings of anger and fear were still expected to 
mediate these effects. 
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Table 1  
Study 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Association  
Beliefs (1) 
5.43 1.35 --          
Linked Fate (2) 3.83 1.93 .30* --         
Anger (3) 4.98 1.87 .38** .57** --        
Fear (4) 4.40 2.02 .28** .65** .73** --       
Pathway to  
Citizenship (5) 
4.42 2.00 .33** .66** .67** .59** --      
Citizenship for 
Childhood  
Arrivals (6) 
3.95 1.91 .25** .60** .52** .50** .74** --     
Arrests and  
Deportations (7) 
2.77 2.01 -.08 .36** .01 .17* .20* .39** --    
Closeness to Undoc. 
Immigrants (8) 
4.43 1.92 .33** .67** .69** .63** .72** .62** .16 --   
Closeness to Other  
Latinos (9) 
5.87 1.22 .23** .30** .37** .30** .34** .26** -.06 .48** --  
Belonging (10) 5.45 1.32 -.01 -.10 -.14 -.25** -.13 -.07 .06 -.034 .18* -- 
Note: Significance of p < .05 indicated by * and p < .01 by **. 
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Before proceeding with tests of moderated mediation, I ran linear regression analyses to 
test for a potential interaction between the two predictors. The results for the linear regression 
analyses are presented in Table 2. Across the five tests, the results revealed no significant 
interaction between Latino-Undocumented association beliefs and perceived linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants. Therefore, the prediction that there would be significant interaction 
between the two predictors was not supported. On the other hand, except for feelings of 
belonging, the main effects for each predictor on the outcome variables were significant or 
approaching significance. Considering these findings, I proceeded with tests of anger and fear as 
mediators for the effects of each predictor. Hayes’ PROCESS Macro Model 4 in SPSS was used 
to test for the mediation effects reported below. Anger and fear were included as parallel 
mediators, and confidence intervals were calculated with bootstrap samples of 50,000. 
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Table 2  
Linear regression analyses results for Study 1. 
 
Pathway to  
Citizenship 
Arrests &  
Deportations 
Closeness to 
Undocumented 
Immigrants 
Closeness to Other 
Latinos 
Feelings of  
Belonging 
Association 
Beliefs 
β = .12+ β = -.25** β = .14* β = .16+ β = .02  
Linked 
Fate 
β = .64***   β = .43***  β = .63***   β = .26** β = -.11 
Interaction β < .01 β = -.14+ β = -.02  β < -.01   β < .01    
R2 .47 .19 .47 .11 .01 
F 42.94*** 11.35*** 43.17*** 6.30*** 0.53 
df 3, 145 3, 147 3, 147 3, 147 3, 147 
Note:  Significance of p < .10 indicated by +,  p < .05 by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
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Political Mobilization to Support Pathway to Citizenship Policies.  
 The first test of mediation looked at the effect of association beliefs and linked fate on 
willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies. The 
results are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3  
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Political Mobilization to Support Pathway to Citizenship Policies 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower 
limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs .08 .09 .209 -.06 .29 
Mediator — Anger .43 .09 <.001 .24 .60 
Mediator — Fear .25 .08 .006 .07 .39 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .14 .05 -- .06 .25 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .06 .04 -- .01 .15 
Predictor — Linked Fate .45 .07 < .001 .29 .56 
Mediator — Anger .35 .08 < .001 .19 .51 
Mediator — Fear .04 .08 .681 -.12 .19 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .20 .06 -- .09 .32 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .02 .07 -- -.09 .16 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 1 Mediated effect of association beliefs on support for a pathway to citizenship policies 
in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, there was an indirect effect of association beliefs on support for a 
pathway to citizenship policies. The effect was fully mediated by both feelings of anger (β = .14, 
SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 0.06, upper 95% CI = 0.25) and fear (β = .06, SE = 0.04, lower 95% 
CI = 0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.15). Latino-Americans who reported more association beliefs also 
reported more feelings of anger and fear. As feelings of anger and fear increased, participants 
were more willing to participate in various political activities to support a pathway to citizenship 
policies. 
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Figure 2 Mediated effect of linked fate on support for a pathway to citizenship policies in   
Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 In contrast, while greater perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants predicted 
more willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies, the 
effect was partially mediated only by feelings of anger (β = .20, SE = 0.06, lower 95% CI = 0.09, 
upper 95% CI = 0.32) (Figure 2). Perceived linked fate predicted an increase in both anger and 
fear. However, the indirect effect via fear was not significant (β = .02, SE = 0.07, lower 95% CI 
= -0.09, upper 95% CI = 0.16). 
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Political Mobilization to Support Arrest and Deportation Policies.  
 Next, I tested the mediation effects of anger and fear on willingness to engage in political 
activities to support policies that would increase arrests and deportations of undocumented 
immigrants. The complete results for the mediation tests are listed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4  
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Political Mobilization to Support Arrests and Deportations Policies 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs -.10 .13 .247 -.40 .10 
Mediator — Anger -.24 .13 .051 -.51 .01 
Mediator — Fear .38 .12 .002 .15 .60 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger -.09 .04 -- -.19 -.01 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .11 .04 -- .04 .18 
Predictor — Linked Fate .50 .10 < .001 .32 .72 
Mediator — Anger -.38 .12 < .001 -.64 -.18 
Mediator — Fear .13 .12 .292 -.11 .36 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger -.22 .07 -- -.36 -.10 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .08 .08 -- -.10 .21 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 3 Mediated effect of association beliefs on support for increased arrests and deportations 
in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 Latino-American participants who reported more association beliefs also expressed more 
support for policies that would increase arrests and deportations of undocumented immigrants 
(Figure 3). This effect was indirect and mediated by an increase in participants' fear that 
immigration policies can personally impact them in the future (β = .11, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI 
= 0.04, upper 95% CI = 0.18). Feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants did not 
mediate the effect of association beliefs (β = -.09, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.19, upper 95% 
CI = -0.01). 
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Figure 4 Mediated effect of linked fate on support for increased arrests and deportations in 
Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
In contrast to the relationship between association beliefs and support for arrests and 
deportations, the relationship between linked fate and this policy type was negative (Figure 4). 
As perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants increased, feelings of anger increased 
too. The indirect effect via anger was significant (β = -.22, SE = 0.07, lower 95% CI = -0.36, 
upper 95% CI = -0.10); greater feelings of anger predicted less support for arrests and 
deportations. The indirect effect via feelings of fear was not significant (β = .08, SE = 0.08, 
lower 95% CI = -0.10, upper 95% CI = 0.21). 
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Feelings of Closeness to Undocumented Immigrants. 
 The next set of analyses focused on participants' feelings of closeness to undocumented 
immigrants. The results for the mediation analyses for both association beliefs and linked fate are 
listed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5  
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Closeness to Undocumented Immigrants 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs .08 .09 .215 -.06 .28 
Mediator — Anger .47 .09 <.001 .30 .66 
Mediator — Fear .27 .08 .002 .09 .41 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .18 .05 -- .08 .28 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .07 .04 -- .02 .16 
Predictor — Linked Fate .38 .07 <.001 .24 .52 
Mediator — Anger .42 .08 <.001 .27 .58 
Mediator — Fear .08 .08 .360 -.09 .23 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .24 .05 -- .13 .34 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .05 .06 -- -.07 .19 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 5 Mediated effect of association beliefs on feelings of closeness to undocumented 
immigrants in Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by 
***. 
 
As shown in Figure 5, both anger (β = .18, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 0.08, upper 95% 
CI = 0.28) and fear (β = .07, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.02, upper 95% CI = 0.16) mediated 
the effect of association beliefs on feelings of closeness to undocumented immigrants. More 
reported association beliefs predicted more feelings of anger and fear. The angrier and more 
scared that participants felt, the closer they felt to undocumented immigrants. 
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Figure 6  Mediated effect of linked fate on feelings of closeness to undocumented immigrants in 
Study 1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
Perceived linked fate also predicted feeling closer to undocumented immigrants (Figure 
6). This effect was partially mediated by feelings of anger (β = .24, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 
0.13, upper 95% CI = 0.34) but not fear (β = .05, SE = 0.06, lower 95% CI = -0.07, upper 95% 
CI = 0.19). Latino-Americans who perceived more linked fate were angrier about the treatment 
of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. Participants who felt angrier about the treatment of 
undocumented immigrants reported feeling closer to them.  
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Feelings of Closeness to Other Latinos. 
 Next, I looked at the mediation effects on feelings of closeness to other Latinos. Table 6 
shows the results of the tests of mediation for feelings of closeness with other Latinos.  
 
Table 6.  
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Closeness to Other Latinos 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs .10 .07 .183 -.05 .24 
Mediator — Anger .18 .08 .018 .03 .33 
Mediator — Fear .05 .07 .493 -.09 .18 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .10 .06 -- -.01 .22 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .02 .04 -- -.04 .10 
Predictor — Linked Fate .13 .06 .18 -.04 .21 
Mediator — Anger .28 .07 .01 .04 .33 
Mediator — Fear .01 .07 .93 -.14 .15 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .16 .07 -- .01 .31 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .01 .08 -- -.15 .18 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 7 Mediated effect of association beliefs on feelings of closeness to other Latinos in Study 
1. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 The results showed that association beliefs did not indirectly or directly predict feelings 
of closeness to other Latinos (Figure 7). Although paths a and b via anger were significant, the 
overall indirect effect via anger was not significant (β = .10, SE = 0.06, lower 95% CI = -0.01, 
upper 95% CI = 0.22). Similarly, the indirect effect via fear was not significant (β = .02, SE = 
0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.04, upper 95% CI = 0.10). 
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Figure 8 Mediated effect of linked fate on feelings of closeness to other Latinos in Study 1. 
Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 
 Linked fate did indirectly predict an increase in feelings of closeness to other Latinos 
(Figure 8). The indirect effect via anger was significant (β = .16, SE = 0.07, lower 95% CI = 
0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.31). However, there was no indirect effect via fear on feelings of 
closeness to other Latinos (β = .01, SE = 0.08, lower 95% CI = -0.15, upper 95% CI = 0.18). 
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Feelings of Belonging in America. 
 Finally, the remaining mediation tests focused on feelings of belonging in America. 
Table 7 shows the complete results for these mediation tests. 
 
Table 7.  
Study 1 Mediation Analyses – Feelings of Belonging in America 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs .05 .08 .566 -.12 .22 
Mediator — Anger .08 .09 .513 -.12 .23 
Mediator — Fear -.32 .08 .007 -.36 -.06 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .03 .06 -- -.08 .14 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear -.09 .05 -- -.20 -.01 
Predictor — Linked Fate .09 .07 .384 -.08 .21 
Mediator — Anger .08 .09 .493 -.11 .23 
Mediator — Fear -.37 .08 .005 -.41 -.08 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .05 .08 -- -.11 .20 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear -.24 .09 -- -.44 -.06 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 9 Mediated effect of association beliefs on feelings of belonging in America in Study 1. 
Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 
 More reported association beliefs did predict a decrease in feelings of belonging, 
although it did so indirectly (Figure 9). Fear mediated the relationship between the variables (β = 
-.09, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = -0.20, upper 95% CI = -0.01). However, anger was not a 
significant mediator (β = .03, SE = 0.06, lower 95% CI = -0.08, upper 95% CI = 0.14).  
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Figure 10 Mediated effect of linked fate on feelings of belonging in America in Study 1. 
Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 The results for linked fate mirrored the results for association beliefs. Greater perceived 
inked fate indirectly predicted a decrease in feelings of belonging (Figure 10). Although fear was 
a significant mediator of this relationship (β = -.24, SE = 0.09, lower 95% CI = -0.44, upper 95% 
CI = -0.06), anger was not (β = .05, SE = 0.08, lower 95% CI = -0.11, upper 95% CI = 0.20). 
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Discussion 
Correlational data from Study 1 provide initial support for the prediction that both 
symbolic threats to perceptions of the ingroup and realistic threats to the self from the conflation 
of undocumented immigrants and Latinos shape 1) Latino-Americans’ support for a pathway to 
citizenship policies, 2) their positive feelings about undocumented immigrants and other Latinos, 
and 3) decreases their feelings of belonging in the U.S. Except for perceptions of belonging in 
America, feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants more consistently mediated 
these effects. Fear mediated the effects of both association beliefs and linked fate on feelings of 
belonging. It is likely that because the feelings of anger that were measured in this study were 
not about the self (e.g., anger on behalf of another group), they are less important in determining 
whether Latino-Americans feel at home in America. Although fear partly explained participants’ 
willingness to politically mobilize for association beliefs, it did not mediate the effects of linked 
fate. Across the various test, the standardized coefficients showed that fear was a weaker 
mediator than anger. A power analysis showed that 312 participants were needed for this study, 
but the final sample was much smaller. It is possible that there were not enough participants in 
this study to fully capture the effects of fear. In Study 2, a much larger sample will be needed to 
accurately test fear as a mediator of both association beliefs and linked fate. 
The results for political mobilization to support policies that would increase arrests and 
deportations of undocumented immigrants provided conflicting support for increased or 
decreased support. I hesitate to interpret the results too deeply as the policy appeared to be 
overwhelmingly unpopular among participants (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11 A frequency distribution of participants’ average reported willingness to engage in 
political activities to support a policy that would increase arrests and deportations in Study 1. 
 
Out of 152 participants who responded to the question, few participants were willing to 
say that they would be very likely to participate in political activities to support policies that 
would lead to an increase in arrests and deportations. Sixty-eight participants (approximately 
45% of the sample) said they were very unlikely to participate in all the listed political activity 
that would support this type of policy. In contrast, while several participants were also unwilling 
to participate in activities that would support a pathway to citizenship policies, participants were 
generally more enthusiastic about these policies (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12 A frequency distribution of participants’ average reported willingness to engage in 
political activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies in Study 1. 
 
 Unfortunately, the manipulation of the independent variables did not work as expected. 
Given how much attention the conflation between undocumented immigrants and Latinos has 
received in recent years, perceptions about symbolic threats to the ingroup and realistic threats to 
the self in the context of immigration may be less malleable. Similarly, the extensive attention 
that this topic has received may have made information about a weak association between 
undocumented immigrants and low linked fate between participants and undocumented 
immigrants less believable. In Study 2, the weak association and low linked fate condition will 
be replaced by control conditions. Finally, because many participants missed the main idea of the 
articles they read, Study 2 will aim to make the articles and information check questions more 
understandable for participants.  
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Study 2: Effect of Conflation on Political Mobilization, Solidarity, & Belonging  
In Study 2, I again experimentally test how symbolic threats to Latinos and realistic 
threats to the self, impact Latino-Americans' engagement in political activities and their attitudes 
about undocumented immigrants. For both independent variables, the experimental 
manipulations were changed. Control conditions replaced the weak association and low linked 
fate conditions. Moreover, the high linked fate condition was also replaced. In Study 1, the high 
linked fate article was about an increase in wrongful arrests. There is generally less information 
about wrongful arrests that is available to the public, so it may have been unclear to participants 
how to interpret the increase in arrests that were described in the article. In Study 2, participants 
read about a policy that will potentially increase the racial profiling of Latinos. It was expected 
that participants would be better able to interpret this manipulation as a personal risk to 
themselves. 
Like in Study 1, participants are again asked to report their willingness to mobilize 
politically to support policies that are both favorable to immigrants or more punitive. However, 
although participants were still asked to describe their attitudes about undocumented immigrants, 
the focus in Study 2 was on their desire to distance from undocumented immigrants, not feelings 
of closeness. Finally, a new measure was added to assess participants’ willingness to work with 
undocumented immigrants to overcome challenges to both groups. 
Method 
 Participants. Three hundred and twelve U.S.-born Latinos were initially recruited using 
the Prolific survey platform. However, of those who completed the survey, only 269 were 
included in the final sample. Participants were excluded if they answered the information check 
questions incorrectly, did not identify as Latinos a second time at the end of the survey, or 
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indicated that they were not born in the U.S. when they were asked again at the end of the 
survey. In the final sample, the average age was 29.08 years (SD = 9.59), and 59% of 
participants were men. Approximately 53.9% identified as Democrats, 9.7% as Republicans, and 
26.4% as Independents. Unlike in Study 1, only 38.1% reported that both parents were born in 
the U.S., 23.5% indicated that at least one parent was an immigrant, and 38.3% indicated that 
both parents were immigrants. 
 Design and procedure. Participants were asked to take part in a 2 (strong Latino-
undocumented association vs. control) x 2 (high linked fate vs. control) between-subjects 
experiment and were compensated $1.60 for completing the study. For Study 2, the same cover 
story and procedure from Study 1 were used.  
 In the strong association condition, participants read the same article from the strong 
association condition in Study 1. However, the appearance of the article was updated (see 
Appendix E for complete article). In the control condition, participants read an article that 
reported how Americans overestimate the number of homeowners in the U.S (see Appendix F 
for complete article). The article used the same format as the article from the strong association 
condition but was written to exclude any information about Latinos or immigration. 
 In the high linked fate condition, participants read an article about a federal court 
allowing police departments to carry on with a nationwide program that would increase the racial 
profiling of Latinos. The article included the excerpts below (see Appendix G for complete 
article): 
 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the constitutionality of a federal program, 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws in Local Communities (EILC), designed to give local 
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police departments more authority to identify and detain individuals suspected of residing 
in the U.S. illegally. 
 
Legal analysts predict that the court’s recent ruling will significantly increase the 
likelihood that Latino Americans who are U.S. citizens or legal residents will be racially 
profiled and wrongly stopped and detained in local communities. 
 
The remaining participants were in the control condition and read about a lawsuit against 
McDonald’s that was adapted from Craig & Richeson (2012) (see Appendix H for complete 
article). Participants completed a questionnaire after reading the three articles. 
Measures.  
Latino-Undocumented Association Information Check. In the strong association 
condition, participants completed the following question to verify that they understood the 
article: According to the article you just read, the results of the national survey found which of 
the following? 1) Americans overestimate the number of Latinos who are living in the country 
illegally (correct answer for condition); 2) Americans are very accurate when they estimate how 
many Latinos are living in the country illegally; 3) the article did not give this information.  
Linked Fate Information Check. In the high linked fate condition, participants answered 
the following questions to check their understanding: According to the article, a federal court 
made a decision about an anti-immigration program that raised concerns about the racial 
profiling of Latino Americans. Which of the following statements best describes the court's 
decision? 1) The federal court stopped the program; 2) the federal court allowed the program to 
continue (correct answer for condition); 3) The article did not give this information. 
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Latino-Undocumented Association Beliefs. To test whether our manipulation for the 
Latino-Undocumented association variable primed participants with the correct perspective, 
participants responded to the same two questions that were used in Study 1 (r = .67). 
Perceived Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants. Similarly, to test whether the 
manipulation used for the linked fate variable primed participants with the correct perspectives, 
participants responded to the same two questions that were used in Study 1 (r = .49). 
Political Mobilization for Pathway to Citizenship. Participants were asked to describe 
their willingness to engage in various political activities in support of a policy that would 
establish a pathway to citizenship for all immigrants. The description is similar to the description 
used in Study 1. However, participants read a shortened version to account for time constraints: 
“Consider the following policy:  Provide legal status to ALL undocumented immigrants without 
criminal records. How likely is it that you would do the activities below to support this policy?” 
Five political activities were listed: sign a petition; attend a rally or demonstration; write or 
share a post on social media; try convincing friends and family members to support the policy; 
call a senator or representative. Participants indicated their response on a 1 (very unlikely) to 7 
(very likely) for each activity (α = .94).  
Political Mobilization for Citizenship for Childhood Arrivals. To assess their support for 
a policy that would only provide a pathway to citizenship for immigrants that were brought to the 
country as immigrants, participants saw the following: Consider the following policy:  Provide 
legal status ONLY to undocumented immigrants who were brought to the country as children 
and have no criminal record. How likely is it that you would do the activities below to support 
this policy? Participants saw the same five activities that were included in the previous question 
and provided answers on the same scale (α = .92).  
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Political Mobilization for Arrests and Deportations. The following policy description 
was used to assess participants for a policy that would increase arrests and deportations of 
undocumented immigrants: Consider the following policy: How likely is it that you would do the 
activities below to support this policy? Participants saw the same five activities that were 
included in the previous two questions and provided answers on the same scale (α = .95).  
Group Solidarity. To assess participants feelings of solidarity with undocumented 
immigrants, they were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with each of the 
following statements (adapted from Galsford & Calagno (2012)): Latino Americans and 
undocumented immigrants should work together to improve the position of both groups; Latino 
Americans and undocumented immigrants should stick together; Latino Americans and 
undocumented immigrants would be better off if they worked together to improve each group’s 
position. Answers ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (α = .95).  
Social Distancing. Participants were asked how comfortable they would feel when 
interacting with undocumented immigrants across several situations. The ten situations presented 
to participants were adapted from a study about White-Americans social distancing responses 
when primed with stigmatized ingroup members (Kunstman, Plant, & Deska, 2016). The 
following are examples of the described scenarios: Working at a company that employs an 
undocumented immigrant; Having an undocumented immigrant family move into the house or 
apartment next to yours; Dating an undocumented immigrant. Responses ranged from 1 (very 
uncomfortable) to 7 (very comfortable) (α = .95) (see appendix for complete list of items). 
Feelings of Belonging. To measure feelings of belonging in America, participants 
responded to the same three items that were used in Study 1 (α = .76). 
56 
 
Feelings of Anger & Fear. Participants’ feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented 
immigrants (r = .90) and fear about future risks for themselves from immigration policies (r = 
.80) were measured using the same items as in study 1. 
Results 
  Like in Study 1, I first verified the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations. The 
manipulations for both variables were unsuccessful. Participants’ reported Latino-Undocumented 
association beliefs in the strong association condition (M = 5.12, SD = 1.53)  did not differ from 
responses in the control condition (M = 5.26, SD = 1.65), F (1, 267) = .46, p = .501. Similarly 
perceived linked fate did not differ between participants in the high linked fate condition (M = 
3.78, SD = 1.70) or the control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.74), F (1, 266) = .01, p = .917. In the 
analyses that follow, Latino-Undocumented association beliefs and perceived linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants were used as predictors.  
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Figure 13 A frequency distribution of participants’ average reported willingness to engage in 
political activities to support a policy that would increase arrests and deportations in Study 2. 
Although participants' willingness to mobilize to support a policy that would increase 
arrests and deportations was measured, the subsequent predictions and analyses will omit this 
variable. Like in Study 1, many of the participants expressed no support for this policy (Figure 
13). Approximately 64% of the respondents (171 of 268 who answer this question) said they 
were very unlikely to engage in any of the political activities that would support this type of 
policy. Therefore, I did not feel confident that any interpretable conclusions could be made about 
whether association beliefs and linked fate acted as predictors.  Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics for the predictors and outcome variables, as well as the correlations between those 
variables. 
The following predictions were tested in Study 2. A significant main effect of association 
beliefs was expected, such that it would predict the following for participants: 
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• greater willingness to engage in political activities to support a pathway to citizenship 
policies 
• more likely to believe that Latino-Americans should work with undocumented 
immigrants to resolve problems that affect both groups 
• more comfort in situations that would require them to be close to undocumented 
immigrants. 
• fewer feelings of belonging in America. 
Similarly, a significant main effect of perceived linked fate was expected with similar outcomes 
as described above. I also tested for an interaction effect between the two predictors. Based on 
the results from Study 1, I did not predict a significant interaction (in contrast to the original 
hypothesis described in the introduction). 
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Table 8   
Study 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Association Beliefs (1) 5.19 1.59 --          
Linked Fate (2) 3.79 1.71 .37** --         
Anger (3) 5.26 1.76 .57** .47** --        
Fear (4) 3.93 2.04 .50** .55** .57** --       
Pathway to  
Citizenship (5) 
3.83 2.08 .41** .50** .65** .52** --      
Citizenship for 
Childhood Arrivals (6) 
3.75 1.87 .30** .33** .54** .40** .64** --     
Arrests &  
Deportations (7) 
1.95 1.68 -.03 .08 .01 .12 .17** .26** --    
Group Solidarity (8) 5.04 1.76 .58** .47** .67** .44** .61** .44** -.02 --   
Social Distance (9) 5.68 1.42 .41** .38** .59** .33** .48** .32** -.12 .57** --  
Belonging (10) 5.23 1.31 -.29** -.18** -.22** -.29** -.15* .01 .10 
-
.20** 
-.16* -- 
Note: Significance of p < .05 indicated by * and p < .01 by **. 
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Because anger proved to be a consistent mediator in Study 1, I predicted that anger 
mediates the effects of the two predictors on each outcome variable except for feelings of 
belonging. In contrast, I predicted that fear would mediate the effects of the predictors on support 
for a pathway to citizenship policies and feelings of belonging. 
Next, I ran linear regression analyses to test for an interaction effect between the two 
predictors on each of our outcome variables (see Table 9 for complete results). Although there 
was no evidence of a significant interaction between the two predictors, there did appear to be 
significant main effects. Therefore, I proceeded with mediation tests using Hayes’ PROCESS 
Macro Model 4 in SPSS, and confidence intervals were calculated with bootstrap samples of 
50,000. Like in Study 1, anger and fear were included as parallel mediators in each model. 
 
 
Table 9  
Linear regression analyses results for Study 2 
 
Pathway to  
Citizenship 
Group  
Solidarity 
Social 
Distance 
Feelings of  
Belonging 
Association 
Beliefs 
β = .25***   β = .45***   β = .29***   β = -.27***   
Linked 
Fate 
β = .37***   β = .31***   β = .27***   β = -.08   
Interaction β = -.02 β = -.05 β = -.05 β = -.01 
R2 .27 .41 .23 .09 
F 32.62*** 61.40*** 25.62*** 8.64*** 
df 3, 262 3, 263 3, 261 3, 263 
Note:  Significance of p < .10 indicated by +, p < .05 by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
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Political Mobilization to Support Pathway to Citizenship Policies.  
First, the mediation effects of anger and fear on willingness to engage in political 
activities to support a pathway to citizenship policies were tested (Table 10). As in Study 1, the 
items for both a pathway to citizenship for all immigrants and only immigrants who are 
childhood arrivals were combined into one variable. The results for the combined variable are 
described below. 
 
Table 10  
Study 2 Mediation Analyses – Political Mobilization to Support for Pathway to Citizenship Policies 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs -.02 .07 .693 -.15 .10 
Mediator — Anger .56 .06 <.001 .45 .69 
Mediator—Fear .20 .05 <.001 .08 .28 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .32 .04 -- .24 .40 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .10 .04 -- .03 .18 
Predictor — Linked Fate .14 .06 .011 .04 .27 
Mediator — Anger .51 .06 <.001 .41 .64 
Mediator—Fear .14 .05 .021 .02 .22 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .24 .04 -- .16 .33 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear .08 .04 -- .01 .16 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 14 Mediated effect of association beliefs on support for a pathway to citizenship policies 
in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 Association beliefs had an indirect effect on participants’ willingness to engage in various 
political activities to support pathway to citizenship policies via anger (β = .32, SE = 0.04, lower 
95% CI = 0.24, upper 95% CI = 0.40) and fear (β = .10, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.03, upper 
95% CI = 0.18) (Figure 14). As participants reported more association beliefs, their feelings of 
anger and fear increased. More feelings of anger and fear predicted a greater willingness to 
mobilize politically to support these policies. 
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Figure 15 Mediated effect of linked fate on support for a pathway to citizenship policies in   
Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 Similarly, anger (β = .24, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.16, upper 95% CI = 0.33) and fear 
(β = .08, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.16) partially mediated the effect of 
linked fate on participants’ willingness to engage in political activities to support pathway to 
citizenship policies (Figure 15). More perceived linked fate predicted more feelings of anger and 
fear. Participants who were angrier and more fearful were more willing to participate in these 
activities. 
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Group solidarity with undocumented immigrants. 
 Next, I looked at participant responses to the measure of group solidarity. Table 11 shows 
the complete results of the tests of mediation.  
 
Table 11  
Study 2 Mediation Analyses – Group Solidarity 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs .28 .06 <.001 .20 .43 
Mediator — Anger .53 .06 <.001 .41 .63 
Mediator—Fear -.01 .05 .898 -.10 .09 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .30 .05 -- .21 .39 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear -.01 .03 -- -.07 .06 
Predictor — Linked Fate .18 .06 .001 .07 .29 
Mediator — Anger .60 .05 <.001 .49 .71 
Mediator—Fear -.01 .05 .928 -.10 .09 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .29 .04 -- .20 .37 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear -.01 .04 -- -.07 .07 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not calculated 
in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 16 Mediated effect of association beliefs on group solidarity in Study 2. Significance of  
p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
Anger (β = .30, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = 0.21, upper 95% CI = 0.39), but not fear (β = 
-.01, SE = 0.03, lower 95% CI = -0.07, upper 95% CI = 0.06), mediated the effects of association 
beliefs. Participants who reported more association beliefs also felt angrier about the way 
undocumented immigrants are treated in the U.S. (Figure 16). Feeling angrier about this 
treatment predicted that participants believed there should be more solidarity between the two 
groups. Feelings of fear did not mediate this effect. 
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Figure 17 Mediated effect of linked fate on group solidarity in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 
indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 Similarly, anger (β = .29, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 0.20, upper 95% CI = 0.37), but not 
fear (β = -.01, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.07, upper 95% CI = 0.07), mediated the effects of 
linked fate. Participants who perceived more linked fate with undocumented were more likely to 
feel angrier and more fearful (Figure 17). However, only feelings of anger predicted agreement 
that there should be more solidarity between the two groups. 
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Social Distancing from Undocumented Immigrants. 
 Next, I looked at the participants' desire to socially distance themselves from 
undocumented immigrants (Table 12). Both association beliefs (Figure 18) and perceived linked 
fate (Figure 19) predicted that participants would feel comfortable in various situations with 
undocumented immigrants (i.e., lower desire to socially distance). For both predictors, anger was 
the only mediator of these effects. 
Table 12 
Study 2 Mediation Analyses – Social Distance 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs .11 .06 .076 -.01 .21 
Mediator — Anger .54 .05 <.001 .33 .54 
Mediator—Fear -.03 .04 .655 -.11 .07 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .31 .05 -- .21 .41 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear -.01 .03 -- -.08 .05 
Predictor — Linked Fate .15 .05 .013 .03 .23 
Mediator — Anger .55 .05 <.001 .34 .54 
Mediator—Fear -.06 .05 .355 -.13 .05 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .26 .04 -- .18 .35 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear -.03 .04 -- -.11 .04 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 18 Mediated effect of association beliefs on social distancing in Study 2. Significance of 
p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 There was an indirect effect of association beliefs via anger (β = .31, SE = 0.05, lower 
95% CI = 0.21, upper 95% CI = 0.41) (Figure 18). However, the indirect effect via fear was not 
significant (β = -.01, SE = 0.03, lower 95% CI = -0.08, upper 95% CI = 0.05). When participants 
reported more association beliefs, they also reported feeling angrier about the treatment of 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (Figure 18). More feelings of anger predicted feeling more 
comfortable in social situations with undocumented immigrants. There was no effect of fear and 
desires to socially distance from undocumented immigrants. 
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Figure 19 Mediated effect of linked fate on social distancing in Study 2. Significance of p < .05 
indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
There was an indirect effect of linked fate via anger (β = .26, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = 
0.18, upper 95% CI = 0.35) but not fear (β = -.03, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.11, upper 95% 
CI = 0.04). When participants reported greater linked fate, they also reported feeling angrier 
about the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (Figure 19). More feelings of anger 
predicted feeling more comfortable in social situations with undocumented immigrants. Like 
with association beliefs, fear did not mediate this effect. 
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Feelings of Belonging in America. 
Finally, I tested the effects of both predictors on feelings of belonging in American and 
whether those effects were mediated by anger and fear (Table 13).  
 
Table 13 
Study 2 Mediation Analyses – Feelings of Belonging in America 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Association Beliefs -.19 .06 .013 -.27 -.03 
Mediator — Anger .01 .06 .934 -.11 .11 
Mediator—Fear -.20 .05 .007 -.22 -.04 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger .01 .05 -- -.10 .10 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear -.10 .04 -- -.18 -.03 
Predictor — Linked Fate -.01 .06 .871 -.12 .10 
Mediator — Anger -.07 .05 .344 -.16 .06 
Mediator—Fear -.24 .05 .002 -.25 -.06 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger -.03 .04 -- -.11 .04 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Fear -.14 .05 -- -.23 -.05 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 20 Mediated effect of association beliefs on feelings of belonging in America in         
Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 For association beliefs, there was a significant indirect effect via fear (β = -.10, SE = 
0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.18, upper 95% CI = -0.03) but no significant indirect effect via anger (β 
= .01, SE = 0.05, lower 95% CI = -0.10, upper 95% CI = 0.10). Participants who reported more 
association beliefs were more fearful about future risks to themselves, which predicted a 
decrease in feelings of belonging (Figure 20). Association beliefs did predict an increase in 
anger, but there was no relationship between feelings of anger and feelings of belonging. 
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Figure 21 Mediated effect of linked fate on feelings of belonging in America Latinos in               
Study 2. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 Similarly, there was a significant indirect effect of linked fate via fear (β = -.14, SE = 
0.05, lower 95% CI = -0.23, upper 95% CI = -0.05) but no significant indirect effect via anger (β 
= -.03, SE = 0.04, lower 95% CI = -0.11, upper 95% CI = 0.04). Participants who reported 
greater perceived linked fate were more fearful about future risks to themselves, which predicted 
a decrease in feelings of belonging (Figure 21). Linked fate also predicted feeling angrier about 
the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., but there was no relationship between 
anger and feelings of belonging. 
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Discussion  
 Consistent with the results of Study 1, correlational findings from Study 2 provided 
additional support that Latino-Undocumented association beliefs and perceived linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants predict a greater willingness to mobilize politically in support of a 
pathway to citizenship policies. Both association beliefs and perceived linked fate also predict a 
decrease in feelings of belonging among Latino-Americans. These results confirmed the study 
hypotheses. Similarly, anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants mediated the effects of both 
predictor variables on political mobilization for a pathway to citizenship policies. Moreover, only 
fear about future personal risks to Latino-Americans mediated the effects of both predictors on 
feelings of belonging in America. These findings again mirror the results found in Study 1.  
In Study 2, fear also mediated the effect of both predictors on political mobilization for a 
pathway to citizenship policies. The observed mediation effects of fear in Study 2 differ from 
fear’s mediation effects observed in Study 1. Fear only mediated the effect of association beliefs 
on political mobilization for the pathway to citizenship policies and did not mediate the effect of 
linked fate in Study 1. It is likely that, given the substantial differences in sample sizes between 
the two studies, Study 2 was better able to detect the mediation effects of fear for the political 
mobilization outcome variable. 
 New to Study 2 were measures of group solidarity and social distancing. Both association 
beliefs and linked fate predicted a greater desire for group solidarity between undocumented 
immigrants and Latinos. Similarly, both association beliefs and linked fate predicted more 
comfort with undocumented immigrants in various social situations, reflecting a lower desire to 
distance socially from undocumented immigrants. Anger, not fear, mediated these effects. 
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 Unfortunately, the experimental manipulations for Study 2 were not successful. 
Perceptions that views about undocumented immigrants affect views about Latinos (Latino-
Undocumented association) and linked fate with undocumented immigrants were not malleable. 
As I suggested in Study 1, recent political events like the 2016 presidential election, may have 
consolidated Latino-Americans’ opinions about both variables. To further explore the role of the 
2016 presidential election in shaping perceptions of linked fate and later support for policies 
related to undocumented immigration, I analyzed survey data of Latino-Americans shortly after 
the election took place in Study 3. The main goal of Study 3 is to understand how Latino-
Americans perceived linked fate with other Latinos during a time when their ethnic group was 
highly conflated with undocumented immigrants shaped their responses several years later. 
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Study 3: Analysis of Panel Data from VOTER Survey 2016 & 2019 
In Studies 1 and 2, participants were surveyed several years after the consequential 2016 
U.S. presidential election. During the 2016 election, there was an extensive focus on 
undocumented immigration and its association with Latinos due in part to Donald Trump’s 
presidential campaign policy proposal of building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. In the years 
since the election, the Trump administration’s approach to undocumented immigration has 
directly impacted immigrants from Latin America. For example, the administration repealed the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy. DACA granted undocumented 
immigrants who were brought to the U.S. as children protection from deportation and gave 
eligible immigrants work permits. The overwhelming majority of immigrants who benefitted 
from DACA are from Latin America (Pew Research Center, 2017). Current court proceedings 
have allowed the policy to remain in place temporarily. Similarly, the Trump administration 
began the controversial policy of separating immigrant families at the U.S.-Mexico border who 
were found crossing the border without authorization or who sought asylum in the U.S. These 
and other actions by the administration have spotlighted undocumented immigrants from Latin 
America. Do perceptions of ethnic linked fate in this context engender support for advocacy on 
behalf of minorities and support for pro-immigrant policies?  
 I expect that in a context where the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos 
is salient, linked fate with other Latinos will show similar effects as linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants. Given the results of Studies 1 and 2 on the effects of linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants, I predict that more perceived linked fate with other Latinos will: 
• Predict more support for a future president that would advocate for minorities.  
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• Predict more support for a policy that would allow DACA recipients to remain in 
the country legally. 
• Predict less support for a policy that separates immigrant families at the border. 
Finally, anger and anxiety (used as a proxy for fear) about American politics were 
included as potential mediators. Because these emotions are broader and focused on 
undocumented immigration or threats to Latinos, it was unclear whether they would mediate the 
effects of linked fate like the emotions in Studies 1 and 2. Based on the results from Studies 1 
and 2, anger was expected to mediate the effect of linked fate on all three outcome variables as it 
has consistently been a robust mediator of political mobilization, attitudes about immigrants and 
Latinos, social distancing, and feelings of solidarity. Anxiety, however, was expected only to 
mediate the relationship between linked fate and support for a president that advocates for 
minorities. In both Studies 1 and 2, fear was consistently a mediator of political mobilization. 
However, it was limited as a mediator of intergroup attitudes in Study 1 and did not predict 
similar attitudes (e.g., solidarity and social distancing) in Study 2. Of the three outcome 
variables, advocacy for minorities most resembles previous measures of political mobilization. 
The other two outcome variables most resemble measures of intergroup attitudes.  
In the dataset analyzed for Study 3, there were no variables that could serve as predictors 
of Latino-Undocumented association beliefs. Therefore, that predictor was excluded from this 
study. 
Method 
 Participants. The sample for study 3 was made up of 222 U.S.-born Latino-Americans. 
The average age of participants was 58.63 years (SD = 11.60) and 50.5% identified as men.  
Approximately 44.6% identified as Democrats, 23.4% as Republicans, 27.5% as Independents.   
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 Design and procedure. For Study 3, data from the Democracy Fund Voter Study 
Group’s VOTER (Views of the Electorate Research) Survey were analyzed. The VOTER Survey 
is an ongoing project that began in 2016, and the survey has been conducted every year since the 
project’s inception. The 2016 survey had an original sample size of 8,637, while the 2019 survey 
had a sample of 6,779 participants of different racial/ethnic backgrounds. Participants were 
recruited through YouGov to participate in the survey.  The most recent dataset released in 
January 2020 includes data from 2016 through 2019 waves.  I focused on a sub-sample of 
Latino-Americans who completed the survey for both the 2016 and 2019 waves, responded to all 
variables of interest, and were born in the U.S.  
 Measures.  
 Perceived Linked Fate with Latinos. In the 2016 survey, participants were asked the 
following question: How much do you think that what happens generally to Hispanics in this 
country will have something to do with what happens in your life? Responses ranged from 1 (a 
lot) to 4 (none). In the analyses reported below, I recoded responses to this question so that 1 = 
none and 4 = a lot. The 2019 survey did not include this question. 
Feelings of Anxiety. In the 2019 survey, participants were asked to report the extent to 
which they experience several emotions in response to American politics: When you think about 
American politics these days, how do you feel? One of those emotions was anger. Responses 
ranged from 1 (do not feel at all) to 7 (feel very strongly).  
 Feelings of Anxiety. Participants also reported their feelings of anxiety. For anxiety, they 
were given the same prompt and response scale that they saw for anger. Anxiety was used as a 
proxy for participants' feelings of fear.   
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 Support for Future President who Advocates for Minorities. In the 2019 survey, 
participants were asked whether it was important that a future U.S. president advocates for 
minority groups: How important is it for the next president to have each of the following 
characteristics? To advocate for racial and ethnic minorities in this country. Responses were 
recoded so that 1 represents unimportant, and 4 represents very important. 
 Support for Allowing Dreamers to Remain in the U.S. Participants were asked whether 
they favored allowing Dreamers to remain in the U.S. in the 2019 survey: Do you favor or 
oppose allowing young adults who were brought to the United States illegally as children to stay 
and work here legally? Responses were recoded so that 1 represents strongly oppose, and 4 
represents strongly favor. 
 Support for Separating Undocumented Immigrant Families. Finally, participants were 
asked how much they agreed with the following statement: It is appropriate to separate 
undocumented immigrant parents from their children when they cross the border in order to 
discourage others from crossing the border illegally. Responses were recoded so that 1 
represents strongly disagree, and 4 represents strongly agree. 
Results 
Table 14 includes the descriptive statistics for each variable, as well as the correlations 
between those variables. 
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Table 14.   
Study 3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Linked Fate (1) 2.53 .86 --      
Anger (2) 5.52 1.56 .01 --     
Anxiety (3) 4.75 1.86 .13 .48 --    
Presidential Advocacy for  
Minorities (4) 
3.16 1.01 .27** .12 .19** --   
Separate Families at  
Border (5) 
3.07 1.10 .24** .14* .09 .54** --  
Allow Dreamers to  
Remain (6) 
1.86 1.16 -.32** -.05 -.10 -.66** -.68* -- 
Note: Significance of p < .05 indicated by * and p < .01 by **. 
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For each mediation test reported below, Hayes’ PROCESS Macro Model 4 was used, and 
ideology and educational attainment were included as covariates. 
Support for Future President who Advocates for Minorities. The results for the test of 
mediation are presented in Table 15. 
 
Table 15 
Study 3 Mediation Analyses – Support for Future President who Advocates for Minorities 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Linked Fate .20 .07 .001 .09 .38 
Mediator — Anger -.02 .05 .780 -.10 .08 
Mediator—Anxiety .14 .04 .052 -.01 .15 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger <.01 .01 -- -.01 .01 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anxiety .02 .01 -- -.01 .05 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 22 Effect of linked fate with other Latinos on support for a future president who 
advocates for minorities in Study 3. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < 
.001 by ***. 
 
 Greater linked fate with other Latinos predicted more agreement with the statement that it 
is important for a future president to advocate for racial and ethnic minority groups. Neither 
anger (β = < .01, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.01) nor anxiety (β = .02, 
SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.05) mediated this effect (Figure 22). The 
effect of linked fate was significant ideology and education were used as covariates. 
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Support for Allowing Dreamers to Remain in the U.S. The results for the test of 
mediation are presented in Table 16. 
 
Table 16 
Study 3 Mediation Analyses – Support for Allowing Dreamers to Remain in the U.S. 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-
Value 
Lower 
limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper 
limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Linked Fate .17 .08 .005 .06 .36 
Mediator — Anger .03 .05 .680 -.07 .11 
Mediator—Anxiety <-.01 .04 .984 -.08 .08 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger <-.01 .01 -- -.01 .01 
Indirect effect of X on Y via 
Anxiety 
<-.01 .01 -- -.02 .02 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were 
not calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 23 Effect of linked fate with other Latinos on support for allowing dreamers to remain in 
the U.S. in Study 3. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
 
 Next, analyses showed that linked fate significantly predicted support for providing legal 
status to undocumented immigrants who were brought to the U.S. as children (Figure 23). Like 
with support for a president that advocates for minorities, anger (β = < -.01, SE = 0.01, lower 
95% CI = -0.01, upper 95% CI = 0.01) and anxiety (β = < -.01, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.02, 
upper 95% CI = 0.02) did not mediate this effect. More importantly, the results held even when 
controlling for differences in ideology and education. 
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Support for Separating Undocumented Immigrant Families. The results for the test of 
mediation are presented in Table 17. 
 
Table 17 
Study 3 Mediation Analyses – Support for Separating Undocumented Immigrant Families 
 
Beta  
Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
p-Value 
Lower limit 
confidence 
interval 
Upper limit 
confidence 
interval 
Predictor — Linked Fate -.25 .08 <.001 -.50 -.18 
Mediator — Anger .07 .05 .268 -.04 .16 
Mediator—Anxiety -.04 .04 .395 -.12 .05 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anger -.01 .01 -- -.02 .01 
Indirect effect of X on Y via Anxiety <-.01 .01 -- -.03 .01 
Note: X = predictor variable, Y = outcome variable. Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals were 
calculated using 50,000 bootstrap samples and a 95% confidence level. P-values listed as -- were not 
calculated in the analysis. P-values listed as -- were not calculated in the analysis. 
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Figure 24 Effect of linked fate with other Latinos on support for separating families at the border 
in Study 3. Significance of p < .05 indicated by *, p < .01 by **, and p < .001 by ***. 
  
Finally, linked fate again significantly predicted changes in our third variable, support for 
separating undocumented immigrant families as deterrence against future undocumented 
immigrants (Figure 24). However, the relationship was negative. As linked fate with other 
Latinos increased, participants were less likely to support this policy. The effect was not 
mediated by feelings of anger (β = -.01, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.02, upper 95% CI = 0.01) 
or anxiety (β = < -.01, SE = 0.01, lower 95% CI = -0.03, upper 95% CI = 0.01). 
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Discussion 
 The results for Study 3 supported the study predictions for the effect of linked fate on the 
outcome variables. More linked fate predicted an increase in support for having a future 
president that advocates for minority groups and support for providing legal status for 
undocumented immigrants who were brought to the country as children (i.e., Dreamers). In 
contrast, more linked fate predicted a decrease in support for separating undocumented 
immigrant families at the border. 
 However, the predictions for anger and fear as mediators were not supported. In Studies 1 
and 2, the measured emotions were specifically about undocumented immigration. For anger, 
participants were asked to think about how they felt about the treatment of undocumented 
immigrants. For fear, participants were asked about their feelings about being treated like an 
undocumented immigrant in the future. However, in Study 3, the emotions were vaguely about 
current responses to American politics. It is possible that emotions that are too broad (as in Study 
3) cannot explain changes in attitudes or behaviors that are motivated by the conflation of 
undocumented immigrants and Latinos. For example, while some participants may have been 
concerned about immigration policies, others may have been angry and anxious about politics 
related to issues like foreign military interventions or the economy. Without more information 
about what about American politics shaped these emotions, the connection between the emotions 
for Study 3 and the emotions measured in Studies 1 and 2 remains unclear. Therefore, the 
possibility that emotions specifically about undocumented immigration could explain the effects 
of linked fate with other Latinos cannot be disconfirmed by the results of Study 3. A future study 
where such emotions are measure could help better compare Study 3 findings to the results of 
Studies 1 and 2. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 In the United States today, undocumented immigrants as a group are often seen as being 
synonymous with Latinos. Given how prevalent the conflation of undocumented immigrants and 
Latinos appears to be among the general public and in news media (Barreto, Manzano, & Segura, 
2012; Perez, 2016; Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013), it was expected that this conflation 
would be perceived as both a symbolic threat against their ethnic group and a realistic threat to 
the self among Latino-Americans. Latino-Americans were defined as Latinos who are U.S. born 
citizens, naturalized citizens, or legal residents. Across Studies 1-3, only Latino-Americans who 
were born in the U.S. were included in the study samples. 
 To assess reactions to a symbolic threat, Studies 1 and 2 manipulated the degree to which 
views about undocumented immigrants are associated with views about Latinos (Latino-
Undocumented association). Participants were also asked to report how much they believe that 
Americans view Latinos and undocumented immigrants in the same way (Latino-Undocumented 
association beliefs). To assess reactions to a realistic threat, Studies 1 and 2 manipulated the 
extent to which Latino-Americans in the U.S. are wrongly detained by immigration officials and 
the threat of racial profiling of Latino-Americans by those officials. Moreover, participants were 
asked to report their perceived linked fate with undocumented immigrants. Although the 
experimental manipulations were unsuccessful, participants’ association beliefs and perceived 
linked fate provided further insight into the effects of the symbolic and realistic threats posed by 
the conflation of undocumented immigrants and Latinos. 
 Several outcomes related to political mobilization and intergroup attitudes were 
measured. Both association beliefs and linked fate predicted effects that were in the same 
direction. However, the size of the correlations between the two predictors in Study 1 (r = .30) 
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and Study 2 (r = .37), as well as the face validity of the individual items, do suggest that they 
measured different constructs. As more threat to their ethnic ingroup (association beliefs) and 
more threat to themselves (linked fate) were perceived, Latino-Americans were more willing to 
mobilize in support of a pathway to citizenship policies (Studies 1 and 2).  
Feelings of anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants consistently mediated the 
effects of both predictors on political mobilization. Latino-Americans’ fear that they would be 
treated like an undocumented immigrant in the future also mediated the effect of association 
beliefs on political mobilization (Studies 1 and 2). However, it was only detected as a mediator 
of the effect of linked fate with a larger sample of Latino-Americans (Study 2). Linked fate with 
other Latinos predicted more significant support for a future president that advocates for racial 
and ethnic minorities (Study 3). Like with the measure of political mobilization, support for such 
a president could be a potential defense against threats to Latino-Americans. Broader feelings of 
anger and anxiety that were not specifically about undocumented immigrants or Latinos did not 
mediate this effect. Notably, participants were much less supportive of punitive policies against 
undocumented immigrants in all three studies. In Studies 1 and 2, Latino-Americans were very 
unwilling to support a policy that would increase arrests and deportations. In Study 3, linked fate 
predicted a decrease in support for separating undocumented immigrant families at the U.S.-
Mexico border.  
Association beliefs and linked fate with undocumented immigrants also predicted more 
significant feelings of closeness with undocumented immigrants and other Latinos (Study 1), a 
greater desire for group solidarity between undocumented immigrants and Latinos (Study 2), and 
feeling more comfortable with undocumented immigrants across various social situations (Study 
2). Anger on behalf of undocumented immigrants mediated these effects. However, fear about 
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future risks to themselves did not. It is likely that because these outcome variables focus on an 
outgroup and are not related to avoiding future risks, fear about risks to themselves was not 
relevant to Latino-Americans’ attitudes about undocumented immigrants. 
Finally, in Studies 1 and 2, Latino-Americans’ feelings of belonging decreased as more 
association beliefs were reported and as linked fate with undocumented immigrants increased. 
Only fear about future risks to themselves mediated these effects among Latino-Americans. 
These results appear to support past research, which showed that feelings of belonging among 
Latino-Americans decrease when local immigration policies are more punitive (Huo, Dovidio, 
Jiménez, & Schildkraut, 2018; Schildkraut, Jiménez, Dovidio, & Huo, 2019). 
Limitations 
Across the three studies, there are clear limitations to consider. First, because the 
experimental manipulations for Studies 1 and 2 were unsuccessful, the findings presented here 
do not imply causal relationships between our predictors and outcome variables. This constraint 
also applies to Study 3, as the data analyzed were correlational as well. If perceptions of the 
Latino-Undocumented association and linked fate with undocumented immigrants cannot be 
manipulated, an important next step would be to conduct a longitudinal study in which both 
predictors and their effects are measured over time. This type of study would help establish 
whether the effects observed here persist over time and across different political contexts (e.g., 
during times when there is less focus on undocumented immigration from Latin America or 
under different presidential administrations). 
 For Studies 1 and 2, I argued that participants were more willing to mobilize in support of 
a pathway to citizenship policies when they experienced a symbolic threat to their ethnic group 
and a realistic threat to themselves because of the conflation of Latinos and undocumented 
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immigrants. I argued that a greater willingness to mobilize politically for this type of policy 
represented Latino-Americans’ desire to both support undocumented immigrants and avoid 
future risks to themselves. The experience of fear in these studies was specifically associated 
theoretically with engaging in coping behaviors that would help individuals avoid future risks. 
With the available data, I cannot confirm that this is how Latino-American participants perceived 
support for this type of policy. Future studies should include measures that assess what 
participants hope to achieve by supporting these policies. However, Latino-Americans may not 
be explicitly aware of their motivations when they support these policies (for an example of 
research of automatic decision making, see Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & 
Trötschel, 2001). 
 With the data collected in the studies presented in this report, I cannot identify 
differences in linked fate with undocumented immigrants that might exist between Latino-
Americans of different national backgrounds (e.g., Mexican, Cuban, Dominican). Latino-
Americans of Central American or Mexican descent could feel the most linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants since Mexico and Central American countries (e.g., Guatemala, El 
Salvador) are often linked to stories about undocumented immigration. Alternatively, perceptions 
of linked fate with undocumented immigrants might not differ by national background. In 
Studies 1 and 2, most participants were of Mexican descent (e.g., close to 60% in Study 2), and 
therefore these differences cannot be explored with the current samples. Comparing Latino-
Americans from national backgrounds that are often viewed as having vastly different political 
ideologies (e.g., Cuban-Americans and Mexican-Americans) could help uncover the extent to 
which perceptions of linked fate with undocumented immigrants generalize across Latino 
groups. 
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Finally, although the theories presented in the introduction were about Latinos who are 
citizens or legal residents (e.g., Latino-Americans), only U.S. born individuals were included in 
the sample. The decision to include only U.S. born individuals was made out of concerns that the 
citizenship or residency status of foreign-born individuals could not be verified. Including 
foreign-born individuals in future samples will be important as it will allow for the comparison 
of 1) response differences between foreign-born Latino-Americans with different national 
backgrounds and 2) response differences between U.S.-born and foreign-born Latino-Americans. 
Future Directions 
Exploring the Moderating Role of Group Efficacy Beliefs. Studies 1 and 2 focused in 
part on Latino-Americans’ willingness to participate in political activities in response to the 
conflation of Latinos and undocumented immigrants. Future research should explore the 
potential moderating effects of group efficacy beliefs in this context. Whether people believe 
their ingroup can overcome a collective problem when the members of the group work together 
is known as group efficacy (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). Individuals who 
believe that their group has high efficacy are more willing to participate in activities like 
collective action on behalf of the group (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, 
Spears, & Leach, 2010). Moreover, past experiences with their ingroup can influence a person’s 
efficacy beliefs (Feltz & Lirgg, 1998; Gibson & Earley, 2007; Lester, Meglino, & Korsgaard, 
2002). 
 Some of the political activities that were presented to participants in Studies 1 and 2 can 
be viewed as costly or effortful activities (e.g., attending rallies, calling a senator or 
representative). These activities, however, might also be more impactful. By increasing their 
perceptions of group efficacy, they might be more willing to engage in activities that require 
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them to collaborate with other people. Future studies on the role of group efficacy in this context 
would help identify potential limits on the influence of threats from the conflation of 
undocumented immigrants and Latinos in creating behavioral changes. 
 Exploring the Role of Local Policies on Linked Fate with Undocumented 
Immigrants.  States across the U.S. vary significantly in the degree to which their policies on 
undocumented immigration can be considered punitive. Punitive immigration policies at the 
local level impact Latino-Americans’ perceived linked fate with their ethnic group (Vargas et al., 
2017) and shaped attitudes about undocumented immigrants (Huo, Dovidio, Jiménez, 
Schildkraut, 2018). Given the observed effects from local immigration policies in past research, 
the extent to which Latino-Americans experience linked fate with undocumented immigrants 
may depend on where they reside. In a state with punitive policies, the threat of being racially 
profiled by immigration authorities could increase perceptions of linked fate. 
On the other hand, in states where policies are characterized as more welcoming, Latino-
Americans could perceive less linked fate. In such states, the role of association beliefs could be 
more influential in determining Latino-Americans’ willingness to mobilize politically. If a 
Latino-American experienced less linked fate with undocumented immigrants but had strong 
association beliefs, the results of Studies 1 and 2 would suggest that their willingness to mobilize 
politically could still be high. Therefore, comparing groups of Latino-Americans who reside in 
states with differing approaches to immigration enforcement could be incredibly fruitful in 
highlighting the role of local policies in perceptions of linked fate with undocumented 
immigrants. 
A Direct Comparison of Linked Fate with Undocumented Immigrants and Linked 
Fate with Other Latinos. Future research on Latino-Americans’ political behaviors related to 
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undocumented immigration should directly compare the effects of both linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants and linked fate with other Latinos. In Studies 1-3, both measures of 
linked fate predicted support for a pathway to citizenship policy for undocumented immigrants 
brought to the country as children. However, the role of feelings of anger on behalf of 
undocumented immigrants and of fear for futures risk to the self could only be confirmed as 
mediators for linked fate with undocumented immigrants. For attitudes about immigration and 
support for immigration policies, are both measures of linked fate equally powerful in predicting 
responses among Latino-Americans? A more in-depth exploration of the differences between the 
two types of linked fate among Latino-Americans is crucial.  
Furthermore, a direct comparison of both linked fate measures will allow us to 
understand whether linked fate with other Latinos and with undocumented immigrants develop 
in the same way. Past research indicates that linked with other Latinos is stronger among less 
assimilated Latino-Americans (Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010). Less assimilated Latino-Americans 
may be more likely to have stronger ties to the immigrant community, which could contribute to 
a stronger sense of linked fate with undocumented immigrants. The research presented did not 
explore the effect of assimilation or acculturation on either linked fate with undocumented 
immigrants or other Latinos. Therefore, future research should explore the possibility that the 
effects reported here could become weaker as assimilation or acculturation increases. 
Implications 
 Established Support for Broader Effects of Linked Fate with Undocumented 
Immigrants. To my knowledge, only one other study has explored the impact of linked fate with 
undocumented immigrants on Latino-Americans (Serrano-Careaga & Huo, 2019). Unique to the 
present research was evidence that this type of linked fate does not only predict willingness to 
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mobilize politically for immigration policies but that it may also shape feelings of solidarity with 
undocumented immigrants and feelings of belonging in America. Legally, Latino-Americans 
should feel reassured that their status as citizens or legal residents will ultimately protect them 
from consequences that could result from punitive immigration policies. However, for the 
Latino-Americans surveyed in the studies presented here, having legal status did not lead to 
perceptions of immunity from these policies. Finding support for this recently introduced kind of 
linked fate suggests that individuals can develop linked fate to a group they do not belong to 
even when they are objectively not subject to the same outcomes. 
 These could have implications for the existence of linked fate between other groups. For 
example, non-Muslim groups in the U.S. like Sikhs could perceive linked fate with Muslims. 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, there has been an increased harmful association between 
Muslim Americans and terrorists that is often reinforced by media (Powell, 2011). Although 
Muslim Americans are very diverse phenotypically, the racialization of Muslims in America 
reinforces the association between this group and perceived foreigners with darker skin (like 
Sikhs) that puts both non-Muslims and Muslims at risk for increased discrimination and 
harassment (Kaufman & Niner, 2019). When policies like a “Muslim ban” are discussed by 
politicians, feelings of linked fate between these groups may increase.  
 Fear of Future Risks as a Predictor of Political Mobilization. The current findings 
suggest that the fear of future risks in the context of immigration can act as a catalyst for action. 
While fearful individuals are more cautious in the face of risks (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & 
Fischhoff, 2003), political action in the present could be interpreted as the best precaution against 
risks that threaten their future wellbeing (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010). Study 3 
exemplifies how not just any type of fear can promote action. The content of the experienced 
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fear is important in determining whether active responses are suppressed or promoted 
(Consedine, Magai, Krivoshekova, Ryzewicz, & Neugut, 2004). With increasing support for 
more punitive immigration policies within the federal government during the Trump 
administration, feelings of fear in Latino communities could be incredibly crucial in explaining 
how Latino-Americans respond to these policies. The current studies suggest that perhaps 
observing fear in these communities should not immediately lead to predictions of muted or 
complacent responses from those who feel targeted by policies at either the state or federal level.  
Conclusion 
The title of this paper references the phrase, “United we stand, divided we fall,” which 
originated during the American Revolution. It also reflects how several of the participants across 
the three studies presented here responded to threats from the conflation of undocumented 
immigrants and Latinos. Although these threats can have harmful consequences for Latino-
Americans, such as decreasing their feelings of belonging in America, they also appear to 
increase political mobilization and solidarity, two essential ingredients for social change. 
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Appendix A: Study 1 Strong Latino-Undocumented Association Article 
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Appendix B: Study 1 Weak Latino-Undocumented Association Article 
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Appendix C: Study 1 High Linked Fate Article 
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Appendix D: Study 1 Low Linked Fate Article 
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Appendix E: Study 2 Strong Latino-Undocumented Association 
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Appendix F: Study 2 Control Condition (Latino-Undocumented Association IV) 
 
 
 
 
Picture of home for sale. 
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Appendix G: Study 2 High Linked Fate Article 
   
 
 
 
Picture of a traffic stop from a news report. 
103 
 
Appendix H: Study 2 Control Condition (Linked Fate IV) 
 
 
 
 
Picture of restaurant. 
Article adapted from Craig & Richeson (2012) 
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Appendix I: Study 2 Social Distancing Items 
Adapted from: Kunstman, Plant, & Deska (2013) 
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